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ROBERT C. ELLICKSON t
In his recent article, The City as a Legal Concept,' Professor
Gerald Frug compared the city and the business corporation as pos-
sible vehicles for the exercise of decentralized power. In the course
of his analysis, Frug asserted that American law is deeply biased
against the emergence of powerful cities and, by implication, is less
restrictive on corporate power.2 Joining the circle of critical legal
scholars who want to "rethink" and "restructure" American society,
Frug suggested as a modest first step that cities be empowered to
engage in banking and insurance operations.3 Frug believes that
if cities were to manage enterprises of this sort, individuals would
be better able to influence the decisions that affect their lives. Ac-
cording to Frug, citizen control through participatory democracy
leads to "public freedom," 4 a form of human fulfillment that the
critical legal scholars think an impersonal market economy sup-
presses.5
Despite his prodigious research, Frug never directed his atten-
tion at a third candidate for the exercise of decentralized power:
the private homeowners association. The association, not the busi-
ness corporation, is the obvious private alternative to the city. Like
a city, an association enables households that have clustered their
activities in a territorially defined area to enforce rules of conduct,
to provide "public goods" (such as open space), and to pursue other
common goals they could not achieve without some form of poten-
f Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. A.B. 1963, Oberlin College; LL.B.
1966, Yale University. I am grateful to many people, most notably Wayne Barnett,
Yoram Barzel, Paul Brest, Mark Dynarski, Frank Easterbrook, Ronald Gibson, Mark
Kelman, John Langbein, Robert Mnookin, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Roberta Romano,
and Kenneth Scott, for helpful suggestions. Thomas Hagler (J.D. 1983, Stanford)
provided truly extraordinary research assistance. Because I deliberately set out to
write a controversial article, I am obligated to disclaim all others' responsibility for
anything appearing in the following pages.
This research was supported by the Stanford Legal Research Fund, made
possible by a bequest from the Estate of Ira S. Lillick and by gifts from Roderick
E. and Carla A. Hills and other friends of the Stanford Law School.
1 Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HA.v. L. BEv. 1059 (1980).
2 See id. 1062-67.
3 See id. 1128, 1150-51.
4 Id. 1068 (footnote omitted).
S See infra text accompanying notes 180-267 for an extended critique of Frug's
article.
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tially coercive central authority.6 Although they were relatively
exotic as recently as twenty years ago, homeowners associations
now outnumber cities. Developers create thousands of new asso-
ciations each year to govern their subdivisions, condominiums, and
planned communities.7
American law currently treats the city and the homeowners
association dramatically differently. One is "public"; the other,
"private." In law, as Frug correctly points out, much now turns
on this distinction.8  Frug emphasizes the relative "powerlessness"
of cities, a legal phenomenon he discovers not so much by observa-
tion as by logical deduction from the "dualities" of "liberal
thought." 9
This Article compares the legal status of cities and homeowners
associations. In contrast to Professor Frug, I generally rely on
empirical methods to identify legal phenomena. Part I of the
Article examines the fundamental characteristics of cities and home-
owners associations. Although cities are considered "public" and
homeowners associations "private," I discern only one important
difference between the two forms of organization-the sometimes
involuntary nature of membership in a city versus the perfectly
voluntary nature of membership in a homeowners association. I
assert that this difference explains why cities are more active than
associations are in undertaking coercive redistributive programs.
Parts II, III, and IV describe, and normatively analyze, three rather
disparate puzzles in the current legal treatment of associations and
cities. The first puzzle is that courts are more vigorous in review-
ing the substantive validity of regulations adopted by established
homeowners associations than regulations adopted by established
cities. Considering the "private" nature of the association, one
might have expected exactly the opposite judicial treatment. The
second puzzle is that a city must allocate voting rights to its con-
6 Pioneering explorations of why and how people organize to produce col-
lective goods include J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, TBE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
43-62 (1962); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 5-16 (1965).
7 See Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43
U. Cm. L. REv. 253, 256 (1976).
This Article will ignore the often subtle distinctions between the various forms
of private residential associations. These nuances are explored in Krasnowiecki,
Townhouse Condominiums Compared to Conventional Subdivisions with Homes
Associations, 1 REAL EST. L.J. 323 (1973), and Schreiber, The Lateral Housing
Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
1104 (1969).
8 See Frug, supra note 1, at 1099-1109 (discussion of the emergence of this
distinction).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 186-94.
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stituents according to a formula that homeowners associations are
forbidden to use, and vice versa. Why should one-resident/one-vote
be the required method for cities and one-unit/one-vote the re-
quired method for associations? The third puzzle is the one Frug
concentrated on: the limitations on the power of cities to engage
in business enterprises. I argue that Frug exaggerated city "power-
lessness" and failed to mention the many legal advantages-par-
ticularly tax advantages-a city now has when it competes with a
private organization.
I have deliberately tailored this Article to fit the symposium.
Because homeowners associations do many things that cities also do,
my subject promises to be an unusually fertile one for exploring
the public/private distinction. I also developed my major theses
with the other symposium participants in mind. The editors have
recruited several of the leading critical legal scholars to serve as
commentators. At the risk of becoming cannon fodder, I have
deliberately adopted provocative positions on a series of important,
middle-level legal issues. My main theses, I hope, will be both
meaty enough to inspire the commentators and focused enough to
forestall an excessively abstract debate. For example, will the com-
mentators join me in criticizing the Supreme Court's constitutional
decisions that force cities to adhere to the one-resident/one-vote
rule? 10 Do they support my call for repeal of the current exemp-
tion of municipal-bond interest from federal income taxation? 11
I hereby challenge those commentators who (unlike me) are not
Prisoners of Liberal Thought to apply the insights of critical legal
studies to some concrete, middle-level legal issues that currently
confound policymakers.
I. DISTINGUISHING CITIES FROM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
Professor Frank Michelman, unquestionably the preeminent
legal mind on community governance, has offered a characteristi-
cally useful one-sentence guide for identifying the existence of a
c"governmental" organization:
We know perfectly well, granting that there are inter-
mediate hard cases, how to distinguish governmental from
non-governmental powers and forms of organization:
governments are distinguished by their acknowledged,
lawful authority-not dependent on property ownership-
to coerce a territorially defined and imperfectly voluntary
3o See infra text accompanying notes 159-79.
"1 See infra text accompanying notes 263-67.
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membership by acts of regulation, taxation, and condem-
nation, the exercise of which authority is determined by
majoritarian and representative procedures. 12
Although this particular quotation was an aside in an article mainly
addressed to other issues, a scholar as careful as Michelman no
doubt crafted the sentence to encapsulate insights gained through
years of puzzling over the essence of governmental organizations.
The homeowners association, although certainly one of Michel-
man's "intermediate hard cases," is currently viewed by both ordi-
nary and legal observers as a "private" organization, not a "govern-
ment." 1 In fact, it is sufficiently "private" that it has rarely been
granted any intermediate legal status that a hard case might be
thought to deserve, but instead has been treated much like any
other private organization. This is so even though the modern
homeowners association has virtually all of the indicia that Michel-
man would have us associate with a government. First, a home-
owners association rules a "territorially defined" area, and, in the
usual case, obtains its power to do so through no form of property
ownership. For example, when the members of a condominium
association own the common areas as tenants in common, the asso-
ciation itself owns no real property at all.
Nor does Michelman's list of the tell-tale governmental powers
do much to distinguish a homeowners association from a city. An
association is typically entitled to undertake acts of both regulation
and taxation, as those terms are ordinarily used. Associations, for
example, may restrict to whom a member may sell his unit,14 pro-
hibit certain kinds of conduct (not only in common areas but also
within the confines of individual homes),15 and tightly control the
physical alteration of a member's unit.' 6 An association's "taxation"
takes the form of monthly assessments on members. Assessments
can be raised without the unanimous consent of the membership.
12 Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty"
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE LJ. 1165, 1167 (1977) (emphasis
in original).
1S But see infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (scattered authorities
supporting the notion that homeowners associations should be treated as public
actors in some legal contexts).
14 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 178,
183 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1982) (upholding reasonableness of restriction limiting occu-
pancy of condominium units to persons over 18 years of age).
15 See Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 46 Md. App. 464, 418
A.2d 1233 (1980) (sustaining house rule barring second pets).
16 See Note, Promulgation and Enforcement of House Rules, 48 ST. JonN's L.
Rv. 1132, 1136-39 (1974).
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Payment of an assessment is secured by a lien on a member's unit,
making the assessment is almost as hard to evade as a municipal
property tax is. To be sure, association powers are not as extensive
as those possessed by "public" bodies. The regulations of a home-
owners association in sum are likely to be less intrusive and com-
prehensive than what one finds in a typical municipal code. Cities
have far more ways to raise revenue than associations do. Lastly,
it would be highly unusual for an association to have the power to
condemn a member's unit-the third governmental power Michel-
man lists. Some homeowners associations do have the power to
expel members for misbehavior-a power that comes close to the
power of condemnation.1" But even if they did not, exercise of
eminent domain power by a local government is rare; it would be
remarkable if the presence of this power were a necessary condition
for the use of the adjective "public" in ordinary or legal language.
Nor does one stretch ordinary language out of shape to describe
an association as having "majoritarian and representative pro-
cedures." Much as citydwellers choose a city council, association
members elect a board of directors to manage association affairs.' 8
Only one part of Michelman's description of a government
remains: its "imperfectly voluntary membership." Public entities
have involuntary members when they are first formed. For example,
the statutory procedures for incorporating a new city invariably
authorize a majority (perhaps only concurrent or extraordinary
majorities) to coerce involuntary minorities to join their organiza-
tion.19 By contrast, membership in a private organization is wholly
voluntary.20 A central thesis of this Article is that the presence of
involuntary members is both a necessary condition for the use of
the adjective "public" in ordinary language, and also a powerful
explanation for the different legal treatment currently accorded
public and private organizations.
21
_17See, e.g., Kennedy v. Electric Heights Hous. Ass'n, 61 Pa. Commw. 348,
433 A.2d 639 (1981) (affirming cooperative housing association's expulsion of mis-
behaving member).
38 But cf. infra text accompanying notes 85-103 (describing differences between
the electorates of cities and associations).
19 See generally F. MicnEim"wr & T. SnAN.Low, GoVENmMNT iN URBAN
AnEAs 612-21 (1970).
20 Or, more precisely, a decision to join an association is as voluntary as a
human decision can be. See Tentindo v. Locke Lake Colony Ass'n, 120 N.H. 593,
419 A.2d 1097 (1980) (emphasizing voluntary nature of a member's commitments
to an association). But see Frug, supra note 1, at 1133-36 (membership in a
private organization is not much more voluntary than membership in a public
organization).
21 Although the presence of involuntary members is a necessary condition for
the existence of a "public" organization, it is hardly a sufficient condition. For
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This distinction begets an important corollary on the role of
public and private organizations in carrying out coercive redistribu-
tive programs. Because cities, like other governments, have in-
voluntary members, they can potentially compel redistributions of
wealth from captive members.22 Voluntary private organizations,
by contrast, are inherently ill-suited to undertake coercive redis-
tribution. If a voluntary organization's intended redistributive
policies are known to all from the outset, the policies are not being
coercively imposed on the members who eventually lose wealth
because of those policies. For example, when markets are competi-
tive, universities and hospitals that transfer wealth among various
of their patrons are carrying out consensual, not coercive, redis-
tributive policies. If an ostensible loser from those policies ob-
jected to them, the loser could patronize other institutions that did
not redistribute.
In the case of a homeowners association, ex ante redistributive
policies are unlikely to succeed. Suppose a condominium associa-
tion's initial assessment policy would systematically favor owners of
low-rise dwelling units over owners of high-rise units, and that
high-rise owners would gain nothing from being on the losing end
of this redistribution. 23  If aware of the skewed assessment policy,
persons bidding on high-rise units would bid less than otherwise,
and persons bidding on the low-rise units would bid more. Market
forces would thus capitalize the ex ante coercive redistributive
policy into the initial sales prices of the units, 2 4 offsetting the thrust
of the intended coercive redistribution.
example, a "private" labor union usually has involuntary members, and moreover
has some authority to regulate and tax its members. See M. OLSoN, supra note 6,
at 66-97; Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HAiv. L. REv. 201, 234-35
(1937). However, a labor union lacks a "territorially defined membership" (to
use Michelman's phrase). Thus, that factor also appears to be a necessary con-
dition for a "government" to exist.
Powers of regulation and taxation also seem to be necessary elements. With-
out his consent, the Sierra Club can place James Watt's house within the territory
of its Metropolitan Washington Group, but because it cannot regulate or tax him,
Watt does not regard the Sierra Club as one of his governments.
22 However, most public-finance theorists would in fact assign local govern-
ments little or no role in redistribution. See infra text accompanying notes 139-51.
23 Cf. Thiess v. Island House Ass'n, 311 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
24 Cf. infra text accompanying notes 121-23 (on capitalization of local taxes
and services into land values).
The contractarian model of a homeowners association works best if, especially
at the time of their entry decisions, all households have full information about
community attributes. This assumption is obviously optimistic. Information is
often costly, and information about some community attributes (for example, the
friendliness of immediate neighbors) may be obtainable only through experience.
Nevertheless, several considerations justify my reliance on the contractarian model.
First, because a home purchase dwarfs a household's other expenditure decisions,
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Once inveigled to join, however, a member of an initially
voluntary private organization becomes vulnerable to subsequently
adopted redistributive policies. Ex post redistributive policies can
have bite whenever the member either (1) faces high transaction
costs of exiting; (2) is obtaining irreplaceable surplus value (per-
haps as a result of a long-lived membership); or (3) cannot avoid a
redistributive tax because, if the member were to leave, the tax
would be capitalized into a lower value of the member's share of
the organization. As illustrations, consider a Scrabble@ club director
who announces, just before a tournament is to begin, that all com-
petitors must contribute to a prize kitty to be awarded the winner;
a college that imposes huge tuition increases only on students enter-
ing their senior year to finance scholarships for freshmen; and a
homeowners association that shifts its assessment policies simply to
exploit the political weakness of certain owners.
Although these illustrations show that a voluntary organization
could conceivably accomplish some ex post coercive redistribution
among members, the examples also hint why an organization's pro-
moters would want a legally enforceable rule prohibiting the ex
post adoption of policies solely aimed at coercive redistribution.
First, prospective members would be apprehensive about joining
an organization that could later tax them for purely redistributive
reasons. A prospective member could reduce this uncertainty by
spending resources to obtain information about the views of other
potential members, the decisionmaking processes of the organiza-
tion, and so on. But information is costly. As a result, elimination
of ex post redistributive risks would encourage more people to
drive to a Scrabble@ tournament, enroll in college, and buy into a
homeowners association. Second, aside from information costs, most
prospective members could be expected to have an aversion to the
risk of unformulated redistributive programs. Third, and perhaps
most important, because of the administrative costs of adopting and
administering redistributive programs, redistribution is a negative-
sum game.25 Losers lose more than gainers gain. Thus even an
entrant who would expect to fare about average in redistribution
households tend to shop carefully for housing units. Second, in some situations at
least, a market will work efficiently even for consumers who do no comparison
shopping; a nonshopper can sometimes rationally decide to freeload on the shopping
efforts of other households that have tastes similar to his. See Schwartz & Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Rtv. 630 (1979). Third, the contractarian model
encourages individuals to improve their abilities to make decisions for themselves.
25 Yoram Barzel deserves credit for recognizing that rent-seeking by association
members would give rise to deadweight losses.
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wars would favor a peace treaty barring that form of warfare be-
cause the treaty would enable him to save on defense expenditures.
To maximize the initial value of memberships, therefore, the
promoters of a voluntary organization would want an ex ante rule
(contractual, statutory, or judge-made) prohibiting the ex post
adoption of policies solely aimed at coercive redistribution among
members. This corollary helps explain several current features of
the law of homeowners associations.
26
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATIONS
Both cities and homeowners associations regulate the conduct
of residents. Both may have rules requiring that dogs be kept on
leashes, that residential structures be built in a Colonial style, or
that external noise from social gatherings cease at 8:00 p.m. Never-
theless, courts rightly use different standards in reviewing the sub-
stantive validity of public and private rules.
In the case of public rules, the basic federal constitutional
constraints arise from the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. More often than not, the constitu-
tional issue is whether the contested regulation is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. In the hands of most state and federal
courts, this test now usually proves undemanding.
27
Because the fourteenth amendment only applies when state
action is present, one might expect even greater judicial deference
to the substantive validity of private regulations. In fact, however,
courts are more vigorous in their examination of the validity of
certain types of private regulations. Prevailing common-law and
statutory rules ask courts to scrutinize the "reasonableness" of pri-
vate regulations-an apparent invitiation to Lochnerian activism.
This active judicial review is inappropriate when the provisions
contained in an association's original governing documents are at
issue, but it is fully appropriate when litigants challenge amend-
ments to those documents.
A. Judicial Review of the "Constitution" of a
Private Association
The initial members of a homeowners association, by their
voluntary acts of joining, unanimously consent to the provisions
26 See infra text accompanying notes 51-53 & 97-103 (discussing unanimity
rules for wealth-shifting amendments and the practice of allocating votes according
to economic stake).
27 See generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MNN. L.
REv. 1 (1980).
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in the association's original governing documents. 28 In the lan-
guage of Buchanan and Tullock, this unanimous ratification ele-
vates those documents to the legal status of a private "constitu-
tion." 29 The original documents-which today typically include a
declaration of covenants, articles of association (or incorporation),
and by-laws-are a true social contract.30 The feature of unanimous
ratification distinguishes these documents from and gives them
greater legal robustness than non-unanimously adopted public con-
stitutions, not to mention the hypothetical social contracts of
Rousseau or Rawls.
In most instances, familiar principles of contract law justify
strict judicial enforcement of the provisions of a private constitu-
tion. Strict enforcement protects members' reliance interests. By
allowing the establishment of, and subsequently protecting the
integrity of, diverse types of private residential communities, courts
can provide genuine choice among a range of stable living arrange-
ments.31 Proper legal nourishment could enable private associations
to supply quasi-public goods, such as local parks and security serv-
ices, that in the past have been more frequently supplied by cities.
This could lead in turn to a reduced role for the city-the more
coercive (less consensual) form of residential organization.
32
281 assume throughout that an association is created through a fair contracting
process-that is, one not tainted by fraud, duress, gross inequality of bargaining
power, and so on.
29J. BUcHANAN & G. TuLuocK, supra note 6, at vii (a constitution is a set of
rules, unanimously adopted in advance, within which subsequent action is to be
conducted); see also Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of
Private Associations, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 983, 995-97 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Judicial Control].
3 0 UrBAN LAND INST., THE Hocm:s Associ~roN HANDBooK 342-45 (1964)
explains the interrelationships among these documents.
31 See also Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43
HAIIv. L. REv. 993, 1027 (1930):
The value of autonomy is a final reason which may incline the courts to
leave associations alone. The health of society will usually be promoted
if the groups within it which serve the industrial, mental, and spiritual
needs of citizens are genuinely alive. Like individuals, they will usually
do most for the community if they are free to determine their own lives
for the present and the future.
For contractarian perspectives on nonterritorial private associations, see Ellman,
Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69
CALI. L. RPv. 1378, 1402-05 (1981); Judicial Control, supra note 29, at 1001-02.
The purely contractarian view of the nonterritorial association is criticized in
Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the
Common Law, 29 BuFFALo L. RPv. 599, 602, 612-15 (1980) (emphasis should be
on fiduciary relationships); see also Chafee, supra, at 1001-10 (association's mis-
conduct is better analyzed by applying tort doctrine).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 12-21.
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External legal norms of course constrain the contracting process,
and in some instances should lead to the judicial invalidation of
offensive "constitutional" provisions, such as those that would regu-
late the racial characteristics of association members.33 Neverthe-
less, because original membership in an association is more volun-
tary than original membership in a city, an association's constitution
should be allowed to contain substantive restrictions not permissible
in a city charter. For example, if a group of orthodox Jews set up
a condominium and stipulated by original covenant that males were
required to wear yarmulkes in common areas on holy days, a court
should enforce that original covenant in deference to the unanimous
wishes of the original members. An identical "public" regulation
would, of course, violate the first amendment's ban on the establish-
ment of religion, and perhaps a number of other constitutional
guarantees.
The pattern of judicial decisions tends to honor the suggested
principle of greater private associational autonomy. Although the
Supreme Court has recently held that age is not a suspect classifica-
tion,34 lower courts perceive municipal zoning by age as posing
serious constitutional questions.5 By contrast, homeowners-asso-
ciation regulations that limit the age of dwelling occupants have
tended to survive legal challenge.3 6 As a second example, private
associations have successfully defended design controls (dealing with
exterior paint colors and so on) whose public counterparts would
make city attorneys squirm.
37
In sum, as a Florida appellate court has perceived, the "reason-
ableness" standard that courts apply to an association's post-forma-
33See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of
racially discriminatory covenants would violate the equal protection clause).
34 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per
curiam).
35 See, e.g., Adrian Mobile Home Park v. City of Adrian, 94 Mich. App. 194,
288 N.W.2d 402 (1979) (age restriction attached to special use permit held un-
constitutional); see also Doyle, Retirement Communities: The Nature and Enforce-
ability of Residential Segregation by Age, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 64, 89-97 (1977)
(older persons may have constitutional right to live with younger family members).
But cf. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016
(1976) (sustaining constitutionality of age classification in zoning ordinance).
36 See O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 178, 183
Cal. Rptr. 111 (1982); see also Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747
(1974) (court finds state action is present but holds that age restriction is
rationally related to a legitimate objective); White Egret Condominium v. Franklin,
379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979) (although reasonable restrictions on age of occupants
might be valid, condominium association was estopped from enforcing its restrictions).
See generally Note, The Enforceability of Age Restrictive Covenants in Condominium
Developments, 54 S. CAL. L. RPv. 1397 (1981).
37 See, e.g., West Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 138 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1956) (enforcing association rule that all houses be painted white).
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tion actions should not apply to provisions of the association's
original constitution:
[The original] restrictions are clothed with a very strong
presumption of validity which arises from the fact that
each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of
and accepting the restrictions to be imposed. . . . [A]l-
though case law has applied the word "reasonable" to
determine whether such restrictions are valid, this is not
the appropriate test, and to the extent that our decisions
have been interpreted otherwise, we disagree. Indeed, a
use restriction in a declaration of condominium may have
a certain degree of unreasonableness to it, and yet with-
stand attack in the courts. If it were otherwise, a unit
owner could not rely on the restrictions found in the
declaration of condominium, since such restrictions would
be in a potential condition of continuous flux.38
B. Judicial Review of a Private Association's Actions to
Implement Its "Constitution"
When courts are asked to rule on the validity of an associa-
tion's actions to flesh out and apply its original constitution, they
currently apply the previously mentioned test of "reasonableness."
The association's governing documents 39 or a state statute 40 may
call for application of the reasonableness standard; if not, courts
imply the standard as a matter of law into the original constitu-
tion.41  The reasonableness standard applies to several types of
association actions. It constrains all administrative actions-for
example, an association's decision to expel a member, to veto the
transfer of a membership, or to deny approval of architectural
plans. 42 In addition, it constrains the substance of all "legislation"
3sHidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (emphasis in original).
39 See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (governing documents empowered condominium association's
board to adopt "reasonable rules and regulations").
40Ten statutes of this sort are cited in Note, Judicial Review of Condominium
Rulemaking, 94 HArv. L. REv. 647, 652 n. 29 (1981).
41 See, e.g., Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541,
270 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n,
556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
42 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Electric Heights Hous. Ass'n, 61 Pa. Commw. 348, 433
A.2d 639 (1981) (expulsion of member); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger,
119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981) (transfer of membership); Rhue
v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969) (en banc) (ar-
chitectural review). See generally Scavo, Dispute Resolution in a Community
Association, 17 URaB. L. ANN. 295 (1979).
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that an association adopts by procedures less cumbersome than the
association's procedures for a constitutional amendment.43 "Legis-
lation" would include, for example, house rules that a board of
directors might adopt under an express grant of authority in the
original declaration.
"Reasonable," the most ubiquitous legal adjective, is not self-
defining. In reviewing an association's legislative or administrative
decisions, many judges have viewed the "reasonableness" standard
as entitling them to undertake an independent cost-benefit analysis
of the decision under review 44 and to invalidate association de-
cisions that are not cost-justified by general societal standards. This
variant of reasonableness review ignores the contractarian under-
pinnings of the private association. As some courts have recognized,
respect for private ordering requires a court applying the reason-
ableness standard to comb the association's original documents to
find the association's collective purposes, and then to determine
whether the association's actions have been consonant with those
purposes.45 To illustrate, the reasonableness of a board rule ban-
ning alcoholic beverages from the swimming pool area 46 cannot be
determined in the abstract for all associations. So long as the rule
at issue does not violate fundamental external norms that constrain
the contracting process, the rule's validity should not be tested ac-
cording to external values, for example, the precise package of
values that would constrain a comparable action by a public organi-
zation. Rather, the validity of the rule should be judged according
to the enacting association's own original purposes.
C. Procedures for, and Judicial Review of, "Constitutional"
Amendments
Some provisions of a private constitution are likely to become
outmoded as time passes. Architectural controls, for instance, may
43 See generally Note, supra note 40; Note, Condominium Rulemaking-Pre-
sumptions, Burdens and Abuses: A Call for Substantive Judicial Review in Florida,
34 U. FLA. L. REv. 219 (1982).
44 See, e.g., Baum v. Ryerson Towers, 55 Misc. 2d 1045, 287 N.Y.S.2d 791
(Sup. Ct. 1968); Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d
541, 270 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
45 See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670,
174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556
S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Because an association's original governing
documents may be vague about the association's purposes, this will often not be an
easy task.
46 Cf. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (rule prohibiting use of alcoholic beverages in clubhouse and adjacent
areas held reasonable).
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become pass6. Recognizing this, drafters of .both condominium
statutes and association documents usually establish explicit pro-
cedures for "constitutional" amendments. In designing an optimal
amendment procedure, drafters must reconcile two sharply conflict-
ing interests. On the one hand, because members unanimously
approved the original constitution, to authorize constitutional
amendments by less than unanimous vote would imperil the con-
tractual nature of association membership. As the Swedish econo-
mist Knut Wicksell first pointed out, only a unanimity rule assures
that a collective choice will result in a Pareto-superior outcome. 47
On the other hand, a requirement that amendments be unani-
mously approved would often thwart worthy efforts to free associa-
tion members from imprisonment in their original constitution.
If each member could veto amendments, some might withhold
their consent in hope of receiving a side-payment. Transaction
costs, partly arising from strategic behavior of this sort, might then
doom unanimous member approval of an amendment that would
meet Paretian criteria (or, less ambitiously, the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion 48) for efficiency.
To resolve this dilemma, the drafter might consider what de-
cision rule for amendments a member would want to have when
he first joined an association. Before the member knew what spe-
cific amendments would later be considered, the member plausibly
would want an amendment process that would minimize the sum
of the present value of three different types of costs: (1) the op-
portunity costs the member would incur when amendment pro-
cedures prevented an association from adopting amendments that
would benefit the member; (2) the losses the member would suffer
from harmful amendments adopted over the member's dissent
("victimization costs"); and (3) the member's share of the admin-
47See J. Buc x~s & G. TULmOC, supra note 6, at 8 (acknowledging Wick-
sells contributions). A policy meets Paretian criteria when it would make no one
worse off, and at least one person better off. A policy meets the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion---"potential Pareto-superiority"-when the gainers gain more than the
losers lose. Readers unfamiliar with these concepts might consult the fuller
treatment in Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of
the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALir. L. REv. 221 (1980). Richard Posner
defends the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for social decisionmaking in Posner, The Ethical
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HOFsTPA L. REv. 487, 491-97 (1980). For critical appraisals of Posner's position,
see Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect A Bigger Slice?,
8 HoFsnRt L. Rlv. 671 (1980); Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximiza-
tion, 8 HorsmnA L. REv. 509 (1980); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFsTRA
L. REv. 641 (1980).
48 For a description of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, see supra note 47.
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istrative costs of the amendment procedure.49 What this calculus
would suggest to any individual member would depend partly on
whether the member anticipated being in the majority or minority
on most issues, and on how averse the member was to the various
risks, particularly the risks of victimization50 This ex ante calculus
would cause most entrants to prefer different decision rules for
different types of amendments.
1. Unanimity Rules for Wealth-Shifting Amendments
In a prior section, I concluded that a person voluntarily join-
ing a private association would prefer that the association be barred
from subsequently adopting a coercive program whose sole aim
was to redistribute wealth among members.51 Current law recog-
nizes an entrant's ex ante distaste for ex post redistributions. State
condominium statutes, as well as the Uniform Condominium Act,
typically require unanimous member ratification of any amendment
that would alter members' (1) voting rights, (2) shares of ownership
of the common elements, or (3) shares of common expenses.52  The
initial allocation of these three types of rights would be capitalized
into the initial sales prices of the various units. Members propos-
ing to change shares of either voting power or ownership would
virtually always be simply attempting to increase their wealth at
the expense of other members. By barring these redistributions,
these statutory provisions (and contractual provisions like them)
reduce members' costs of joining and managing associations.
3
49 Cf. J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 6, at 63-84 (discussing tension
between member's interests in minimizing "decision-making costs" and in obtaining
benefits from programs that control externalities); Michelman, Politics and Values
or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CRmEITON L. REv. 487,
494-95 (1979) (economics-minded drafter might want to minimize the sum of a
member's costs of "market failure" and "political failure"). Other discussions of
the relative advantages of unanimity rules and majority rules include R. ABRAms,
FOUNDATONS OF PoLrTcAL ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF CoL-
LEcTvE CHOICE 13-26 (1980); D. MUELLER, Puiic CHOIcE 28-49 (1979).
In a subsequent discussion of voting systems, I propose a slightly different (but
not inconsistent) list of considerations a drafter would take into account. See infra
text accompanying notes 78-80.
50 See Michelman, supra note 49, at 498 (noting particular anxieties of "dis-
crete and insular minorities" who might be subject to systematic exploitation by a
majority).
51 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
5 2 See UNF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 2-119(d); UuiF. PLANNED COMMUNI AcT
§ 2-117(d); statutes cited in Note, supra note 40, at 652 n.28.
53 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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2. Nonunanimity Rules for Wealth-Creating Amendments
Members may seek to amend their constitution not only for
purely distributional reasons, but also to improve the efficiency of
their living conditions and fiscal arrangements. An amendment is
"wealth-creating" if it meets the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency,
that is, if gainers gain more from the amendment than losers lose.5 4
Ex ante, a member would not want his association to have a
unanimity rule for wealth-creating amendments. A unanimity rule
would often either thwart change helpful to the member (resulting
in high opportunity costs) or make helpful change procedurally
expensive (resulting in high administrative costs). To reduce those
expected costs, an entrant would therefore be willing to risk incur-
ring victimization costs-the losses that losing members incur from
a wealth-creating amendment.
However, for a risk-averse entrant, to shift from a unanimity
rule to a mere majority rule for passage of wealth-creating amend-
ments might unduly increase risks of victimization. A drafter can
only try to approximate the optimal decision rule-that is, the rule
that would minimize the sum of the three costs. The current
compromise, evident in both statutes and association documents, is
to require that members approve potentially wealth-creating amend-
ments by some intermediate extraordinary majority. Although this
appro(ach is sound, it should be supplemented with another method
of accommodating majority and minority interests; the drafter
should insert, or a reviewing court should imply, a "taking clause"
(similar to the constitutional clause that restricts public entities)
into the association's original governing documents.
a. Extraordinary Majorities
The Uniform Condominium Act generally forbids a member-
ship from amending its original declaration of covenants by less
than a sixty-seven percent vote.55 Moreover, the Act states that the
declaration can itself call for an even larger majority.56 Some
creators of condominium associations have accepted this invitation
and required ninety percent approval of amendments proposed
during the first twenty years of association operations and seventy-
five percent approval thereafter.57 This particular formula pre-
54 See supra note 47.
55 See UNIF. CoNDoMrnrumi ACT § 2 -119(a) ("The declaration may specify a
smaller number only if all of the units are restricted exclusively to nonresidential
use."); see also statutes cited in Note, supra note 40, at 652 n.27.
66 See UNiF. CoNDoMiNIuM ACT § 2-11 9 (a).
57 See P. RoHaN, REAL PROPERTY 11-23 (1981) (illustrative declaration).
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supposes, probably with good reason, that entrants would perceive
the opportunity costs of a ninety percent approval rule as increasing
with time.
Even if his association had an express taking clause promising
compensation of objective losers from an amendment,58 an entrant
in his ex ante calculation probably would still want to require
amendment approval by extraordinary majority. To avoid reliance
on victims' self-interested testimony about losses, legal damages are
usually measured by diminutions in market value. This measure
of damages can be unfair to victims with atypical tastes. For ex-
ample, if most elderly people dislike the presence of dogs, an
amendment banning dogs in a retirees' condominium association
where dogs had originally been explicitly allowed would probably
raise the market value of all units.59 However, a member who
loved dogs might nevertheless suffer a deep subjective loss and be
skeptical of the adequacy of damage remedies.60 In his ex ante
calculation, this member might therefore favor supplementing the
taking clause with an extraordinary-majority rule for constitutional
amendments. 61
58See infra text accompanying notes 62-77.
59 Cf. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n v. Saverio, 360 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) (bylaw prohibiting new pets, including pets acquired to replace prior
pets already licensed with the association, held void as an attempt to impose
retroactive regulations).
'60The member could be skeptical for another reason. Administrative-cost
considerations may excuse an association bound by a taking clause from indemnify-
ing even the objective victims of an amendment. See infra text accompanying
note 65.
61 Business corporations make less use of extraordinary majority rules than
homeowners associations do. The greater diversity of interests of association mem-
bers explains this pattern. Business shares are generally homeogeneous in quality.
(When there are different classes of stock, separate majorities of each class may
be required for approval of an amendment that affects the classes differently.)
Moreover, business shareholders tend to have a single common purpose: maximizing
the value of their shares. A business shareholder's subjective valuation of a share
(reservation price) tends not to deviate much from market price because a share-
holder has numerous fungible investment opportunities. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) (criticizing Carney, Funda-
mental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 Am.
B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 69, 112-18). Because shareholders of a widely held cor-
poration tend to have common interests, a majority of shareholders cannot easily
enrich itself at the expense of a minority. Therefore corporate shareholders have
relatively little need for either extraordinary-majority voting rules or for judicial
review of the reasonableness of majority-approved actions. (In a close business
corporation, where an owner-employee is not unlikely to value his shares at greater
than their market value, extraordinary majority rules are more common. See gen-
erally W. CARY & M. EisENBE R, CoupoA=ONs 448-65 (5th ed. 1980).)
By contrast, because of the uniqueness of real estate and the emotional ties
that bind one to one's residence, an association member may have a reservation
price well above market price. The member will thus consider the effect of an
amendment not only on the market value of his unit, but also on his subjective
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b. Taking Clauses6 2
Although an entrant into an association would be chary of a
rule requiring unanimous member approval of wealth-creating
amendments, he would also fear being regularly on the losing end
of the amendment process. A taking clause in the original con-
stitution that entitled losers from amendments to compensation
would appear to be an attractive way to resolve the entrant's di-
lemma. If an amendment would indeed be wealth-enhancing,
then the gainers would still favor it even if they had to compensate
the losers. A policy of full compensation of losers also ensures the
Pareto superiority of amendments.6 3
There is, of course, a catch: the potentially high administra-
tive costs of rendering accurate compensation. Administrative-
cost considerations may explain why, to my knowledge, drafters of
association constitutions have never included express taking clauses,
and why condominium statutes do not impose a taking clause as a
matter of law. Nor have courts and commentators discussed the
compensation possibility; they seem to perceive the only alterna-
tive to be property-rule 64 protection of either the majority or
minority.
Private taking clauses nevertheless have great promise in
reconciling majoritarian flexibility and minority rights. As I
would apply it, a private taking clause would give any objective
loser from an amendment a prima facie entitlement to compensa-
tion. An association would be freed from liability only if it could
valuation of the unit. More importantly, every unit has a unique location and
almost certainly other unique features as well. These two heterogeneities-in
owners' valuations and in quality of units-make it more likely that an association's
amendments (compared to a business corporation's amendments) will seriously dis-
gruntle a minority.
Cities understandably make sparing use of extraordinary majority procedures.
In contrast to an association's declaration, a municipality's charter was not unani-
mously approved. If the charter was approved by (say) majority vote, there is no
reason to subject amendments to a stiffer approval requirement.
62The discussion in this section owes much to Frank Michelman's classic
article, Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "just Compensation" Law, 80 Haav. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
6 3 Although a unanimity rule also ensures the Pareto superiority of amendments,
a unanimity rule is likely to unloose destructive strategic behavior. See supra
text accompanying note 48. Members prone to hold out for strategic reasons can
do much less damage if an association protects minorities only by means of an
extraordinary-majority rule coupled with a taking clause.
64 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (distinguishing property
rules that protect entitlement-holders with injunctions from liability rules that pro-
tect entitlement-holders with the remedy of damages).
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make out a defense derived from the Michelman fairness test.65
This defense would place on the association the burden of proving
both (1) that the challenged amendment was indeed wealth-en-
hancing, that is, that it met the Kaldor-Hicks criterion; and (2)
that the losers should be able to see why the failure to compensate
would fit into a consistent compensation practice that would be
in their own long-run self-interest (for example, by lowering other-
wise insuperable administrative-cost hurdles to the adoption of
wealth-enhancing amendments). To reduce adjudication costs, an
express taking clause included in a private constitution could specify
that taking disputes between associations and members were to be
decided by compulsory arbitration.
Alternatively, legislatures and courts could imply a taking
clause as a matter of law to help association members resolve their
conflicts. Partly because lawmakers and judges would be hard put
to order use of a system of compulsory arbitration, an express
clause in the declaration is preferable. If the drafter failed to
insert a taking clause, however, a court could invoke the common-
law "reasonableness" standard for association actions to entitle the
victim of an association amendment to taking-clause protection.
Where an association could not make out its fairness defense, a
court would condition its validation of an amendment on the
association's compensating the losers.
A brief review of some actual amendment disputes will demon-
strate the promise of a private taking clause-whether express or
implied. In a first class of cases, the association majority has sought
to "rezone" a subarea of the association's territory. An amend-
ment like this may be wealth-creating. For example, freeing a
few association lots from original convenants that prohibit non-
residential uses could expedite the opening of conveniently located
neighborhood stores.6 6 A relaxation of this sort, however, is apt
to injure a few association homeowners who own immediately
adjacent lots. Responding to the pleas of these neighbors, courts
in three appellate cases have flatly banned all subarea amendments
as a matter of common law.67 Had they instead implied a taking
clause as a matter of law, these courts could have protected the
neighbors without placing association restrictions in a strait jacket.
65 See Michelman, supra note 62, at 1218-1224.
66 Cf. Ridge Park Home Owners v. Pena, 88 N.M. 563, 544 P.2d 278 (1975)
(association cannot selectively remove covenant barring commercial uses).
6 7 See Riley v. Boyle, 6 Ariz. App. 523, 434 P.2d 525 (1967); Ridge Park Home
Owners v. Pena, 88 N.M. 563, 544 P.2d 278 (1975); Montoya v. Barreras, 81 N.M.
749, 473 P.2d 363 (1970).
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Takings jurisprudence has even more obvious relevance when an
association majority has voted to impose new restrictions on se-
lected lots. In Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta Asso-
ciation, 8 a Florida court upheld severe new restrictions on the
ground that the restrictions were "reasonable"; the court, however,
failed .to consider whether the reasonableness standard also re-
quired the association to compensate the victimized lot owners.
In a second class of cases, a majority of association members
has approved amendments imposing user fees for certain services
that the association had previously financed out of general assess-
ment revenue: As with a municipal fiscal system, a switch from
general financing to benefits financing can be wealth-creating.0 9
Nevertheless, a shift like this inevitably inflicts some immediate
disadvantage on the members who had particularly benefited from
the previously "free" provision of the service in question. Two
reported decisions involve the earthshaking issue of washing-ma-
chine finance. In one, a New York court upheld an association's
imposition of a two-dollar-per-month user-charge (for extra water
consumed) on members who had installed washing machines at a
time when all water was paid for as a "common expense." 7o A
Florida decision, Thiess v. Island House Association,71 involved
the validity of an amendment affecting formerly communal laundry
machines. The amendment gave the owners of the two units on
each floor of the association's high-rise buildings the exclusive right
to use the machines on their floor, but also required that those
owners thereafter maintain the machines at their own expense.
The court, interpreting Florida statutes, held that the amendment
would affect the members' shares in the common surplus and ex-
penses and that the amendment could therefore only be adopted
by unanimous vote. In neither of these cases did the reviewing
court consider conditioning its approval of the association's new
fiscal policy on the compensation of the objective losers.
In the third class of cases, a majority of the membership has
approved an amendment to the land-use restrictions applicable to
all units, but the uniform change aggrieves a minority of unit
owners. A dramatic example would be an amendment prospec-
tively prohibiting occupancy by children, adopted to the dismay of
68316 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (amendment forbade multi-
family uses permitted by original covenants).
69 See generally PUiIC ICES FOn PuBLIC PR ODcs (S. Muslkin ed. 1972).
70 Vernon Manor Coop. Apartments v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 178 N.Y.S.2d
895 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
71311 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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fertile young couples who had joined the association in reliance on
an express policy allowing children.72 An analogous situation
arose in Warren v. Del Pizzo 7 3 where the original covenants ap-
plicable to a rustic residential subdivision in Oregon limited the
height of buildings to one story. After a few lots had been sold
to purchasers relying on these covenants, owners of over seventy-
five percent of the lots (most of them unsold lots held by a successor
developer) voted to repeal the height restriction. The Oregon
court sustained the validity of the amendment despite the early
purchasers' protests that the amendment imperiled their views of
Mt. Hood. As in the other cases just discussed, the Oregon court
never adverted to the possibility of compensation.7 4
A taking clause invariably carries a "just compensation" clause
in its train. In some of the foregoing examples, diminution in
market value would be an adequate measure of compensation. It
would work for fiscal amendments and in cases like Bay Island
where the losers were investors unlikely to have a reservation price
much above market price.7 5 Using diminution in market value
as the exclusive measure of a loss would be troublesome, however,
when a unit owner could be expected to have considerable surplus
value in his unit. An amendment prospectively banning children
might not reduce the market value of a unit owned by a fertile yet
childless couple, but the amendment might indeed wipe out much
of their surplus, and even induce them to move. Therefore, a
claimant should be entitled to recover not only for any diminu-
tion in market value, but also an amount equal to what a "reason-
able person" in the claimant's particular life situation would lose
in irreplaceable surplus.7 6 The latter figure would of course be a
crude estimate, but nevertheless probably better than awarding
nothing. As always, a claimant would have a duty to mitigate
72 Cf. Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146
Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978) (sustaining legality of a prospective ban on children).
73 46 Or. App. 153, 611 P.2d 309, modified, 48 Or. App. 237, 616 P.2d 1186
(1980).
74 See also Harrison v. Air Park Estates Zoning Comm., 533 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976) (blanket amendment to covenants; possibility of compensation not
discussed).
75 Cf. the provision in UNiF. CoNDoimitrum ACT § 2-119(a), quoted supra note
55, that authorizes amendments by less than 67% vote when an association's units
are exclusively devoted to nonresidential uses.
76 Cf. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 735-37 (1973) (proposing that victims
of nuisances be entitled to recover bonuses to compensate them for lost surplus)
[hereinafter cited as Alternatives to Zoning].
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damages, a duty that might occasionally be interpreted as requir-
ing him to move.
77
III. VOTING RIGHTS IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Current law often compels cities and homeowners associations
to allocate voting power to their members-indeed, to define their
memberships-in dramatically different ways. After describing this
legal pattern, this Part summarizes recent developments in eco-
nomic theory that are relevant to the issue of voting rights. I
conclude that these theoretical developments support a major over-
haul of current voting law.
Evaluation of a voting system requires attention to several
competing considerations. First, unless an organization's members
are indifferent to risks of impoverishment, they would want to
devise a voting system that would tend to lead to the adoption of
policies that met (at least) the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency. 78
This concern will be referred to as the goal of "allocative efficiency."
Second, members would want to keep down the administrative
costs of operating their voting system. Third, and loosely stated,
if the members desired their organization to redistribute wealth,
they would want voting rules conducive to the proper types of
redistribution. Fourth, if members shared the critical legal
scholars' view that participation is to be valued for its own sake,79
they would pay attention to the relative "participation benefits"
of competing voting systems8 0 The complex and usually contradic-
tory nature of these goals makes it unlikely that any particular
voting system will be best in all situations.
77 Because of the homogeneities described supra note 61, business corporations
are not likely to need taking clauses. But cf. Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity
and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corpora-
tion Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 45 (1977) (advocating enactment of a statute
that would entitle a minority shareholder in a business corporation to demand that
the corporation or the remaining shareholders purchase his shares at a court-
determined market value).
78 See supra note 47.
79 See, e.g., Frug, supra note 1, at 1068. The seminal statement is H.
ARENDT, ON REVOLION 115-16, 120-29 (1963).
Scholars with widely diverse outlooks are attracted by the notion that a person
who devotes time to group decisionmaking may not necessarily be incurring a
cost, but rather may be securing a benefit. I am, and so are, e.g., Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Con-
stitutional Scholarship, 90 YA.LE L.J. 1063, 1101-02 (1981); Michelman, supra
note 49, at 506-10.
80 Some commentators might add as a fifth criterion the symbolic value of a
voting system-for example, its success in reflecting democratic ideals of political
equality and majority rule. See Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91
ETIcs 375 (1981); Note, The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARv.
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The weights accorded these competing considerations affect
the crucial decision of who should be entitled to vote. When a
university holds an election to choose a sobriquet for its athletic
teams, the electorate might conceivably include all trustees, faculty,
staff, students, alumni, and donors, or might include only some of
these subgroups. If one favors "representation-reinforcing" rules,s'
one might be inclined to include in the electorate all affected
persons, even though some are less affected than others.8 2 The
redistributive goal certainly suggests giving the vote to the bene-
ficiaries of desired redistributive policies. However, considerations
of both allocative and administrative efficiency often suggest exclu-
sion from the electorate of persons with little stake in substantive
political decisions.
The following discussion emphasizes two models for allocating
voting rights in residential communities. The first model is to
allocate voting rights to residents (usually subject to some addi-
tional qualifications based on age, citizenship, and so on). The
second model is to allocate votes according to economic stake in
the community (perhaps subject to similar qualifications). A rough
approximation of a person's economic stake in community affairs
is the value of his interests in real property located within com-
munity boundaries; 83 community decisions can affect the value of
real property, but rarely the value of moveable assets.8 4
A. The Current Legal Position
To simplify a bit, current legal rules direct cities to allocate
votes according to residency and homeowners associations to al-
locate votes according to economic stake. Tenants are residents,
but they may lack a significant economic stake in local policymak-
ing, especially if they value their leaseholds at the contract rent.85
L. REv. 1571, 1575 (1975). I have not included this fifth criterion on the ground
that political equality and majority rule are presumably not valued in and of them-
selves, but as instruments to advance some or all of the four goals listed in the text.
81 See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTmusT (1980).
82 This has been the general effect of the Supreme Court's decisions on voting
rights in local elections. See Note, State Restrictions on Municipal Elections: An
Equal Protection Analysis, 93 Haxv. L. REv. 1491, 1502-05 (1980).
83 Dollar values are of course an imperfect measure of individual utilities. "A
ten thousand dollar house to one person may mean more to that person than a
hundred thousand dollar house to another." Stewart v. Parish School Bd., 310
F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (E.D. La.), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 884 (1970). But economists
have not yet developed any technique for measuring individual utilities.
84 For a fuller discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 119-38.
85 See id.
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Owners of undeveloped land, nonresidential buildings, or rental
housing usually have a major economic stake in community deci-
sions, but may lack residency. Thus the two voting paradigms
tend to identify rather different electorates.
1. Voting Rights in Local Government Elections
The one-person/one-vote rule that the Supreme Court has
found emanating from the equal protection clause now tightly
constrains the allocation of voting power at the local level of gov-
ernment. In a line of cases beginning with Avery v. Midland
County,"" the Court has required proof of a compelling state in-
terest before it will sustain a voting classification that restricts
the local franchise on grounds other than residence, age, or citizen-
ship.8 7
In its post-Avery decisions, the Court confronted a variety of
local voting rules that conjoined the residency model and the
economic-stake model by extending the franchise only to (1) resi-
dents who (2) also had an identifiable economic stake in local affairs.
In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,88 for example, the Court con-
sidered an Arizona constitutional provision (similar to those in
eleven other states) 8 that gave residents who paid property taxes
the exclusive right to vote on a city's general-obligation bond issues.
In Kolodziejski, as in a variety of analogous decisions,90 the Court
held that the equal protection clause required that the franchise be
extended, on an equal per capita basis, to the landless residents who
had challenged the voting system.
A city might mix the two voting paradigms in another way.
Instead of limiting the vote to persons who meet both residency
and economic-stake criteria-a system the Court has explicitly for-
bidden-a city might extend voting rights to persons who met either
criterion. Such a system gives a vote not only to resident land-
owners-the only group enfranchised under the forbidden Kolod-
ziejski approach-but also to both landless residents and nonresident
86 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
87 See generally Note, supra note 82.
88 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
89 Id. 213 n.11.
90See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (invalidating system that restricted
votes in bond elections to resident owners of taxable real or personal property);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (residents who pay property
taxes cannot be the only persons entitled to vote in elections on municipal revenue
bonds); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (votes
in school district elections cannot be restricted. to residents who either own or lease
property, or are parents of school children).
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owners of city land. A few pre-Avery decisions in fact sustained
the constitutionality of this either-or system.91 Since it issued Avery,
the Court has not had a system like this before it, perhaps because
few cities have tried this mixed form. If the Court were to honor
the reasoning in the Avery line of cases, any municipal attempt to
expand the electorate in this way would be unlikely to survive an
equal protection challenge. The Court's explicit concern in its
city voting cases has been to protect and equalize the voting rights
of city residents.92  Many Justices undoubtedly joined in this en-
deavor in part because they believed that imposition of a one-
resident/one-vote rule would increase progressive redistribution at
the local level. The per capita equalization of political coin can
plausibly be thought to lead to somewhat more equal distribution
of economic coin.93  Because enfranchising nonresident landowners
would cut against the Court's redistributive goal in Avery, this
second type of hybrid voting system is also constitutionally suspect. 4
Although the Court's one-resident/one-vote rule unquestionably
applies to general-purpose local governments such as cities, the
Court has exempted from the rule's application special districts that
serve narrow purposes. An irrigation district, for example, may
allocate voting rights according to assessed valuation of land-an
91 See Glisson v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 346 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1965);
Spahos v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 207 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd per curiam,
371 U.S. 206 (1962). On the other hand, nonresident landowners who have
asserted that they have a constitutional right to vote in local general elections have
not met with success. See Reeder v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Md. 261, 305 A.2d
132 (1973).
92See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968) ("We
hold today only that the Constitution permits no substantial variation from equal
population in drawing districts for units of local government having general govern-
mental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body."); see also Holt
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (equal protection clause
does not require that vote be extended to residents of area beyond city limits even
though city exercises extra-territorial powers there).
9 3 See A. DowNs, AN ECONOmiC TRsoay op DEMOCRACY 198 (1957); see also
infra note 140.
94 See Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 963, 501 P.2d 537, 551,
104 Cal. Rptr. 297, 311 (1972) (dictum: "It is open to question whether the
state can give nonresidents a vote equivalent to that of residents"). But cf. Note,
supra note 80, at 1595-98 (although entitling nonresident landowners to vote in
annexation elections would probably not violate constitutional strictures, their en-
franchisement might be legislatively undesirable). See also infra note 130.
Of course, this second hybrid system does not necessarily lead to less re-
distribution than would occur under the Kolodzieiski scheme. While the second
system is less progressive than the Kolodzieiski scheme to the extent that the
second system enfranchises nonresident landowners, the second system is more
progressive to the extent that it enfranchises tenants. A redistribution-minded
Court, therefore, could conceivably uphold the second system without overruling
Kolodzieiski.
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obvious proxy for economic stake.95 The Court has yet to identify
a persuasive reason for this exception. 96 This failure suggests that
the Court does not have a consistent theory for why local electoral
systems should follow particular paradigms.
2. Voting Rights in Homeowners Associations
Although there are thousands of private homeowners associa-
tions, I know of none with an electoral structure that comports
with the one-resident/one-vote principle. As in business corpora-
tions, voting rights in community associations tend to be appor-
tioned according to share ownership, a rough approximation of
economic stake. State statutes governing condominium associations
sometimes provide that voting rights must be allocated according
to a particular formula, such as one vote per unit,97 or in propor-
tion to floor area.98 Most statutes, however, allocate votes according
to the ownership interests set out in the original declaration, a
system that gives developers some initial flexibility.99 The statutory
intent seems to be that a unit purchaser should be able to know at
the time of purchase what fraction of total voting power attaches
to his unit. A one-resident/one-vote rule would violate this statu-
tory intent because relative voting power would fluctuate with the
vagaries of household composition. Thus almost all state condo-
minium statutes forbid the voting system that the Supreme Court
required in Avery.
A consumer would presumably be willing to pay more to pur-
chase a condominium in an association with a "better" political
system than competing associations have. If the condominium
statutes were preventing developers from maximizing profits, one
might expect developers to seek passage of statutory amendments
authorizing voting by residency in private associations. I am aware
of no evidence that either developers or entrants into new private
9 5 
See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719 (1973); see also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (large water reclamation
district that sells electricity falls within Salyer exception). But cf. Hadley v.
Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (Avery applies to junior college district).
96 See L. TRME, AmmcERAN CONSnTLTIONAL LAW § 13-11, at 765; § 16-56, at
1132-34 (1978); Note, supra note 82, at 1496-97.
9 7 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-70a (West 1978); see also CAL.
ADmI. CODE tit. 10, § 2792(18) (1981); URBAN LAND LNsT., supra note 30,
at 209, 259, 368-87.
9 SSee, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.810(9) (1979); see also MICH. Comp. LAws
ANN. § 559.154(7) (1982 Supp.) (votes can be allocated either by unit value or
one per unit).
99 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-8-7(6) to (7) (1977); Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-551(8) (1974); MiD. REAL PRoP. CoDE ANN. §§ 11-101(h), -107 (Supp. 1981).
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communities are unhappy with the prevailing system of voting by
economic stake. This is a clue that one-resident/one-vote does not
have much consumer appeal as a private voting system.
Regardless of the precise formula used, in virtually all condo-
minium associations, absentee landlords can vote, but their tenants
cannot.100 The owner of multiple units can cast multiple votes
(assuming votes are allocated one per unit). Professor Krasnowiecki's
influential model legal documents go even farther. To prevent
early purchasers from taking control before the developer has
marketed most of the units, Professor Krasnowiecki would effec-
tively grant the developer three votes for every unsold unit during
the initial stages of a development. 0 1 Could one flout the principle
of one-resident/one-vote any more openly?
Voting systems in private associations seem primarily designed
to advance efficiency goals, not the redistributive goals the Supreme
Court was arguably pursuing in the Avery line of cases. Because
the intensity of a voter's interest in a community matter is likely
to be positively correlated with the voter's economic stake in the
community, voting by economic stake appears to be a surer route
to allocative efficiency than voting by residency would be. 0 2 If so,
efficiency-minded entrants into an association would prefer one-
unit/one-vote to one-resident/one-vote. Moreover, members of a
homeowners association can be expected to prefer that the associa-
tion not engage in coercive redistributive programs.103 If political
power were to be allocated in proportion to economic stake, there
would likely be less redistribution than there would be if political
power were allocated more progressively. The current private
voting rules also seem to reflect members' interests in minimizing
administrative costs. The economic stake of an owner depends on
the current market value of his unit (not its value at its creation),
and also on any subjective surplus value he might have in the unit.
Tenants, especially those who value their units at above contract
rent, also have some economic stake. Association voting formulas
almost never reflect these nuances, but instead opt for rules that
are easier to administer-such as one-unit/one-vote.
100 There are exceptions. Tenants are entitled to vote (one vote per dwelling
unit) in village-level elections held in Columbia, Maryland. See Note, Democracy
in the New Towns: The Limits of Private Government, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 379,
390-91 (1969).
101 See URBAN LAND INsT., supra note 30, at 241, 386-87.
102 See infra text accompanying notes 106-118 & 173-76.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
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B. The Relevance of Economic Theory to the Question
of Who Votes
The homeowners-association market's apparent rejection of one-
person/one-vote rules does not necessarily cast doubt on the wisdom
of Avery. Cities are inherently different from associations in at
least two critical ways. First, cities have involuntary members who
never consented to the local electoral system.104 - Judges and legis-
lators might well take it upon themselves to look out for the
political interests of these minorities, but defer to private voting
arrangements out of respect for freedom of contract. Second, be-
cause only cities can coerce membership, cities, but not associations,
undertake coercive redistributive programs.Y°5 These two differ-
ences could justify the current divergence between public and
private voting rules.
Economic theory sheds light on the power of these distinctions,
and on the soundness of current voting law. This section briefly
reviews three strands of relevant economic theory that have yet to
be incorporated in legal analyses of voting rights. The first strand
is the "public-choice" literature, which is primarily relevant in
appraising the allocative efficiency of various voting systems. The
second strand involves the Tiebout Hypothesis of competition
among local governments and the ensuing literature on the effects
of public-sector characteristics on rents. This theoretical strand
helps one identify the persons most inextricably affected by com-
munity decisions. The third strand is the public-finance literature
that explores how the various levels of government in a federal
system should share responsibility for progressive redistributive
programs. This has obvious relevance because Avery and its
progeny may have been aimed at redistributive ends.
1. The Public-Choice Literature
Publication of Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem sparked
new efforts by economists to apply their tools to problems tradi-
tionally viewed as falling within the realm of political science. 06
Subsequent interdisciplinary scholarship led to the emergence of a
new field called "public choice." This field has spawned a special-
10 4 See supra text accompanying notes 12-21.
10 5 See supra text accompanying notes 2Z-26.
106 Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. PoL. EcoN. 328
(1950).
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ized journal 107 and several college textbooks 10 and has begun to
influence the legal literature. 0 9
Public-choice theorists have demonstrated the extraordinary
difficulty of constructing mechanisms that will unerringly assure
that collective decisions promote allocative efficiency-the main goal
with which these theorists seem to be concerned. They, like James
Madison before them," 0 are troubled by voting systems that do not
permit voters to register the intensity of their preferences."' Out-
comes under the most common voting systems will often not meet
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (much less Paretian criteria) for effi-
ciency. In a majoritarian system, for example, a majority can
approve a program that helps its members less than the program
damages the losing minority." 2 If voting power were to be allo-
cated not by headcount, but by economic stake in the issue being
voted on, these inefficient outcomes would be less likely."13
Public-choice theorists have striven to develop new voting
mechanisms that are more likely to result in efficient policy de-
cisions. These mechanisms-the best known of which is the Groves-
Ledyard mechanism "14-need not be described here."15 The salient
feature of the new mechanisms is that they usually ask affected
persons to reveal their preferences by voting with dollars."6 How-
ever, the theorists have so far only developed mechanisms for select-
ing among program alternatives, not candidates for office. The
administrative costs of their systems also often appear to be un-
107 PULIc CHOICE, edited at the Center for Study of Public Choice, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1osR. ABavs, supra note 49; A. FELDmAN, WELFARE ECONOMUCS AND SOCIAL
CHOIcE THEoRY (1980); D. MUELLER, supra note 49.
109 See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802
(1982); sources cited id. 814 n.33.
110 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 53, 60-61 (J. Madison) (Modem Library
ed. 1941) (expressing fear that a majority will execute "plans of oppression").
111 See J. BucamANA & G. TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 125-30; A. Downs, supra
note 93, at 64-66, 184-94; see also R. DAsI, A PREFACE TO DEMocRATc THEORY
90-123 (1956).
112 Political bargaining (logrolling) of course may reduce the frequency of
inefficient outcomes.
113 The commentators who criticize voting systems that fail to account for
intensity of preference imply this result. However, to my knowledge it awaits
both formal and empirical proof.
"14 See Groves & Ledyard, Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to
the "Free Rider" Problem, 45 ECONOMETnICA 783 (1977), discussed in A. FELDNAN,
supra note 108, at 129-34.
115 For descriptions of some proposed mechanisms, see E. CLAR E, DEMAND
REVELATION A.D THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GooDs (1980); D. MUELLER, supra
note 49, at 68-89.
-16 D. MUELLER, supra note 49, at 88-89.
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acceptably high. But who knows what they will concoct in the
future? The important point for present purposes is that current
law generally prohibits both cities and homeowners associations
from experimenting with these types of voting systems. For its
part, Avery generally forbids voting by economic stake in city
elections.117 For their part, the condominium statutes require fixed
allocations of voting strength for all voting matters, and thus also
forbid voting with dollars."
8
2. The Tiebout Hypothesis and the Effect of Community
Characteristics on Rents
Since the publication of a seminal article by Charles Tiebout
in 1956,119 urban economists have tended to conceptualize balkan-
ized metropolitan areas as markets in which residential communi-
ties compete for residents. Each municipality tries to attract house-
holds by developing an appealing package of taxation and expendi-
ture programs. Households choose among these competing environ-
ments by "voting with their feet." A household moves into the
community that offers it the best overall deal; if the deal turns sour,
the household moves to a more enticing community. 20 Tiebout's
model assumed, among other things, (1) that households are fully
mobile, (2) that households have full knowledge of community
characteristics, (3) that a city's policies have no effect beyond city
boundaries, and (4) that markets for communities are perfectly
competitive. If these conditions prevailed, competition among
municipalities would provide urban residents with an appropriate
variety of packages of public goods.
Urban economists have developed a corollary to the Tiebout
Hypothesis. If households indeed shop for communities, the value
of any positive community attribute should be reflected in higher
rents.121 For example, a residential tenant with children should
be willing to pay a higher rent to live in a jurisdiction with an
outstanding school system. By extension, the market value of a
117 See supra text accompanying notes 86-96.
11
8 See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
119 Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. EcoN. 416
(1956), critically appraised in D. MuEnRu, supra note 49, at 125-47.
120 A member dissatisfied with the performance of one of his organizations may
choose not to exit from it, but rather to stay and, by voicing his objections, try to
reform it. See A. HmscnmiA, Exrr, VOICE AND LbYALTY (1970). The Tiebout
model emphasizes the exit option, not the voice option.
121 See, e.g., Sonstelie & Portney, Gross Rents and Market Values: Testing the
Implications of Tiebout's Hypothesis, 7 J. Urn. EcoN. 102 (1980).
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landlord's interest should reflect not only the capitalized value of
local services, but also the capitalized burden of local property
taxes.122 Empiricists have marshalled some support for these theo-
retital propositions.12 3
Interestingly, urban economists have not yet directed their
attention to the pritate provision of residential communities-that
is, the market for homeowners associations. Producers of associa-
tions compete with one another, and potential entrants shop among
the private alternatives. The Tiebout analysis suggests that this
competition, and the related competition between cities and asso-
ciations, tends to promote an efficient distribution of community
types.
The Tiebout Hypothesis has potentially important implica-
tions for the design of voting systems in both public and private
communities. The key insight is that, in a market where rents
are not controlled, many of the benefits of local pro-tenant pro-
grams may be passed on to landlords in the form of higher rents.
In fact, in Tiebout's idealized world, tenants would get little or no
net benefit from new pro-tenant programs. Similarly, the burden
of anti-tenant taxes (for example, taxes on consumption of utility
services) would reduce prevailing rents and thus fall mostly on
landlords. In short, if markets for residential communities were
to meet Tiebout's idealized assumptions, tenants would have little
(conceivably no) economic stake in the substance of community
policies. 2
4
I will soon discuss four important qualifications to this pro-
vocative statement.'2 Subject to those qualifications, the Tiebout
122 See, e.g., Epple & Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition Among Juris-
dictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. PoL. EcoN. 1197, 1212 (1981); Oates,
The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An
Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. PoL.
ECON. 957 (1969); Yinger, Capitalization and the Theory of Local Public Finance,
90 J. POL. ECON. 917 (1982).
123 See sources cited supra notes 121-22; infra note 138.
124 See Epple & Zelenitz, supra note 122, at 1212:
The finding that, in equilibrium, utility of residents of a jurisdiction
is independent of its government's fiscal decisions is a startling result, one
which highlights an important conceptual distinction between residents of
a jurisdiction and its landowners. For residents who rent housing, the
choices of tax rate and government spending level are matters of complete
indifference in equilibriumt. Housing prices will adjust to maintain their
equilibrium utility level. By contrast, the wealth of landowners is directly
affected by the choice of tax rates and level of government service.
See also .Bucovetsky, Inequality in the Local Public Sector, 90 J. POL. EcoN. 128
(1982). But see City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 210 (1970)
(tenants bear all or a large part of burdens of local taxes); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705 (1969) (same).
125 See infra text accompanying notes 131-38.
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model identifies owners of real property as the persons with the
greatest economic stake in community decisions. 'Consider, for
instance, the community decision on which voting system- to adopt.
In choosing among communities, knowledgeable shoppers- would
consider a community's political structure along with other com-
munity characteristics. Suppose a community in Tiebout's idealized
world were to disenfranchise tenants. If all tenants detested that
policy, they would offer less for housing in that community, and
end up paying lower rents. In this hypothetical situation, the
burdens of the political discrimination against tenants would thus
ultimately be borne mostly by landlords.
If tenants actually have relatively little at stake in local affairs,
one would expect their turnout rate to be comparatively low at
city elections held on dates when there were no state or federal
elections. Political scientists have apparently not systematically
studied the effect of form of tenure on participation in city poli-
tics.1 2 6  I have anecdotal evidence that tenants do tend to be rela-
tively less active than homeowners in local affairs. 27 Lack of
involvement by tenants might of course stem from factors other
than their form of tenure-for example, from their relatively higher
mobility, or relatively lower socioeconomic status.
Designers of community voting systems often seem to have
intuitively understood the possibility that tenants have less at stake
126 Political scientists who have studied the correlates of voter turnout in local
elections have not examined the influence of form of tenure. See Alford & Lee,
Voting Turnout in American Cities, 62 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 796 (1968); Hamilton,
The Municipal Voter: Voting and Nonvoting in City Elections, 65 Am. POL. Sm,.
REv. 1135 (1971); King, Comparing Local and Presidential Elections, 9 Am. PoL.
Q. 277 (1981). These investigators have found, however, that the probability of
someone voting in a local election is positively correlated with both his length of
residence and his income. See also R. DAm., WHo Govmuss? 276-301 (1961)
(discussion of correlates of all forms of participation in local politics). See gen-
erally R. Wor.LmNcE & S. RosENSmToN, WHO VOTEs? (1980) (study of 17 possible
correlates (not including form of tenure) of voter participation in national
elections).
A city's taxation and expenditure programs tend to increase in size as its
percentage of tenant-occupied dwelling units goes up. See Lineberry & Fowler,
Reformism and Public Policy in American Cities, 61 Am. POL. Sc. 1REv. 701, 712
(1967) (this is the single best predictor of the size of a local public sector). The
Tiebout model may conceivably help explain this finding. If pure Tieboutian con-
ditions prevailed, only landowners (not tenants) would be damaged by a city's
adoption of an inefficient spending program. Thus a tenant-dominated electorate
could be expected to be less inclined to punish local officials who wasted local
tax dollars.
127 In the California cities of Mountain View, Redwood City, and (prior to
1979) Santa Monica, most city council members have come from homeowner ranks,
even though a majority of the adults in all these cities have been renters. This is,
of course, not direct evidence that homeowners in those cities have been more
likely to vote, although I have some evidence that that has also been the case.
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in community decisions than landowners do. Electorates in private
associations almost invariably include only unit owners.12  Before
the Supreme Court's decision in Kolodziejski, twelve states had
constitutional provisions allowing only resident property owners to
vote on general-obligation bond issues.129  More often than not,
state statutes governing municipal annexation procedures have
given some form of special political voice to owners of land situated
within the area proposed for annexation. 130 The drafters of these
128 See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
130 Prior to the Court's Avery decision in 1968, state annexation procedures
were extremely diverse. (They still are, mainly because few have been amended
on account of Avery.) The various state statutes were reviewed in 1966 in DEP'T
OF URBAN STUDiEs, NAT'L LEAGUE or CITEs, ADJUSTING MuNIcIPAL BOUNDAIEs:
LAw AND PRAcTiCE (1966). This study indicated that at that time, 36 states pro-
vided some form of special voice to persons owning land in the area proposed for
annexation.
In 19 of these states, owner-influenced procedures could be circumvented be-
cause alternative methods of annexation were available. In Arkansas, for example,
either a majority of property owners in the affected area could petition the county
court for annexation, or the annexing municipality could call a special election in
which its voters would decide whether or not to initiate the annexation process.
Compare ARx. STAT. ANN. § 19-301 (1980) with id. § 19-307.
In 17 states, owners had some form of veto power over annexation. For
example, in California, if the owners of one-half or more of the value of the land
to be annexed were to file protests, annexation proceedings were to be halted for a
one-year period, and during this period annexation could occur only if 100% of the
landowners concurred. CAL. Cov'T CODE § 35121 (West 1968), repealed by 1974
CAL. STAT. ch. 478, § 8. Similarly, in Arizona a petition signed by owners of a
majority of the value of taxable real and personal property in the area in question
was required before annexation could occur. Asrz. lEv. STAT. ANN. § 9-471A
(1977).
States that extended electoral power to landowners tended to use one of three
different methods to apportion landowner votes. First, some states allocated votes
in some proceedings in proportion to property value as indicated on property-tax
assessment rolls. A prime example was Delaware, which granted owners voting in
annexation elections one vote for each $100 of assessed property owned. Delaware
granted nonowning residents only one vote each in these elections. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 22, § 101 (1981). In South Dakota, petitions to annex had to be signed
by owners of % of the value of the area to be annexed. S.D. CODwID LAws
ANN. § 9-4-1 (1981).
A second system was to allocate landowner voting power by land area. For
example, in Colorado the petition of owners of 50% or more of the area to be
annexed (exclusive of streets and alleys) was one method for obtaining a voluntary
annexation. COLO. REv. STAT. § 31-12-107(1) (a) (1977). Alabama required that
owners of 60% of the land area to be annexed consent to any proposed annexation.
ALA. CODE § 11-42-2(10) (1977).
Third, several states had some procedures that allocated one vote per owner
regardless of area or value owned. See, e.g., Apu. STAT. ANN. § 19-301 (1980)
(majority of real estate owners affected may apply for annexation provided such
majority owns more than 50% of the land affected); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-2-
4314(2) (1981) (majority of "resident freeholders" can veto annexation).
These three apportionment schemes all had some adherents in 1966. For
example, of the 17 states that granted a form of veto power to landowners in
annexation elections, 10 states had some type of voting-by-value procedures; 4
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various voting systems may have perceived that landowners can be
the persons most inextricably involved in community decisions. A
short-term tenant aggrieved by a community decision can exit (albeit
at the price of paying relocation costs). By contrast, a landowner's
grievance (say, having undeveloped land rezoned as open-space) is
immediately capitalized into a lower land value; if the landowner
exits by selling the land, the cost of the adverse community decision
is realized, not avoided. When incorporation or annexation pro-
ceedings enable a city to add "involuntary" members, the uncon-
senting owners of real property in the affected area would thus
often feel more distress than the unconsenting tenants who live
there would feel.
Now, four important caveats. First, even if there were fierce
competition among communities, tenants would likely have at least
a modest stake in decisions made by cities and homeowners asso-
ciations. To the extent that a tenant has idiosyncratic tastes, a
community policy may reduce (or increase) his surplus value in
his unit. For example, suppose a community closed a putting
green of great sentimental value to Lee Trevino, and of no value
to anyone else. If Trevino were a tenant in that community, he
would suffer a loss. Because Trevino's contract rent is basically
set by the general run of consumer tastes, however, it is unlikely
that market forces would bring about a subsequent, compensatory
reduction in Trevino's contract rent.131 More generally, a settled
had voting-by-area procedures; and 8, one-owner/one-vote procedures. (Several
states had procedures involving more than one of these methods.)
A few more examples will further document the extent to which state legis-
latures experimented with annexation procedures prior to Avery. New Mexico had
an annexation procedure that involved the creation of an arbitration board. The
board consisted of seven members: three chosen by the municipal government that
wished to annex; three resident landowners, chosen in a one-resident/one-vote elec-
tion held in the territory to be annexed; and a seventh member, a county resident
and landowner living outside the affected areas, selected by the first six members.
This board could, by majority vote, approve an annexation proposal. N.M. STAT.
ANN. 3-7-7 to -10 (1981). Oregon developed a procedure known as the "triple
two-thirds" consent rule, under which an election in the area proposed for annexa-
tion need not be held if at least two-thirds of the owners owning at least two-thirds
of the land area and at least two-thirds of the land value consented to the annexa-
tion. Act of May 23, 1961, ch. 511, § 2, 1961 Or. Laws 938, 939-40 (current
version at OR. REv. STAT. § 222.170 (1981)). One Illinois procedure entitled an
owner holding 10 or more unsubdivided acres to exclude his land from an annexa-
tion. ILL. AqN. STAT. ch. 24, § 7-1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
On the current constitutionality of these procedures, see Levinsohn v. City of
San Rafael, 40 Cal. App. 3d 656, 115 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1974) (statutory provision
granting veto power to owners of majority of assessed value of land in area to be
annexed held to violate equal protection clause); Note, supra note 80, at 1594-98.
1
3 1 See generally Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 76, at 735-37 (discussing
a residents nonfungible surplus).
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tenant is likely to have sentimental ties with neighborhood people
and places. These ties may lead him to value his leasehold at a
figure above the contract rent. As with Lee Trevino, this nontrans-
ferable surplus value gives the tenant a stake in community affairs.132
A second and related qualification is that, contrary to one of
Tiebout's simplifying assumptions, the out-of-pocket and aggrava-
tion costs of moving are not trivial. Thus even a short-term tenant
who values his living space at its contract rent has a stake in com-
munity decisions on issues, such as urban renewal or school closures,
whose adverse resolution might force (or induce) him to move. 133
Third, a tenant has a property interest-the leasehold itself-
whose market value can be affected by community policy."3 If a
tenant's rent is fixed during the term of his lease, the magnitude
of his stake increases with the length of his remaining term. For
example, if his landlord is contractually bound not to raise his
rent, a tenant can reap benefits from a community service newly
available in his neighborhood. When the tenant's term ends, how-
ever, his landlord can raise his rent and thereby capture the market
value of the new service. Rent control may prevent a landlord
from responding in this way.lns In a jurisdiction where landlord-
tenant law limits landlords' rights to terminate leases and raise
rents, that legal policy in effect gives short-term tenants the option
of becoming long-term tenants and thereby increases tenants' stakes
in community policies. All short-term tenants consequently have a
stake in rent-control issues, and tenants in cities that have rent
control have a greater stake in the entire range of city policies than
short-term tenants in other cities do. This analysis thus predicts
that tenant turnout at local elections would be higher in cities
132Dunn, Measuring the Value of Community, 6 J. UB. ECON. 371 (1979),
estimates that persons who move away from small towns in rural areas suffer signif-
icant subjective losses of this sort.
133 Statutory provisions, however, may entitle a tenant to recover tangible mov-
ing costs plus a lump-sum dislocation allowance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622,
4624 (1976); see also Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981) (residen-
tial tenants ousted by city's housing-code enforcement program were constitutionally
entitled to just compensation).
134Cf. Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976) (valuation
of long-term lease in eminent domain proceeding).
135 Rent control ordinances are essentially municipal attempts to redistribute
wealth on a short-run basis from landlords to tenants already in residence, Cur-
rent evidence indicates that rent control ordinances do not meet the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion for efficiency because landlords lose more than tenants gain. See C. RYDELL,
C. BAwLr=, C. HsmrsTAD, M. MunRny, J. NFr..S & R. Sims, THE INMAcT OF RENT.
CONTROL ON THm Los ANGELEs HousiNG MAPwEr 87-89 (a RAND Note prepared
for the City of Los Angeles, 1981). The debate over rent control is partly a debate
over whether cities are appropriate instruments for formulating redistributive policies,
a topic discussed infra text accompanying notes 139-51.
[Vol. 130:1519
CITIES AND HOMEOWNERS-'ASSOCIATIONS
that either have rent control, or that might realistically adopt rent
control.13 6
The fourth, and probably most important, qualification is that
markets for communities are not as competitive as the Tiebout
model assumes. For example, a community with unique attributes
or considerable territorial size usually has a degree of monopoly
power. 3' As another example, if too few households are knowl-
edgeable about community characteristics, rents and sale prices will
not fully reflect community quality. Nevertheless, despite the
highly fanciful nature of Tiebout's assumptions, a large number of
empirical studies indicate that rents and sale prices tend to reflect
public-sector characteristics in the way that urban economists have
predicted. 3 The empiricists' findings are not tidy, however, and
thus also serve as reminders that Tiebout's model drastically over-
simplifies the elusive reality of metropolitan organization.
Taken together, these four qualifications suggest that most
tenants are in fact likely to have at least some stake in community
decisions. The qualifications do not, however, render the Tiebout-
inspired literature utterly irrelevant to the issue of voting rights in
local communities. The empirical studies on capitalization of local
fiscal decisions indicate that landowners, qua landowners, do tend
to have a major stake in community decisions. If members of a
residential community wished to distribute political voice only to
persons with a significant economic stake in local political outcomes,
this literature thus suggests that they could plausibly establish
ownership of local land as a qualification for voting. Alternatively,
the empiricists' finding of imperfect competition among cities sug-
'3 8 The recent history of Santa Monica, California, supports this hypothesis.
After successfully pushing through a rent-control initiative in 1979, a renter-
dominated coalition captured control of the Santa Monica city council, displacing
homeowner representatives.
137 Little is known about the elasticity of demand for residence in particular
cities. Early probes include Fischel, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power:
A Reevaluation, 8 J. UnB. EcoN. 283 (1980); Hamilton, Zoning and the Exercise
of Monopoly Power, 5 J. UnB. EcoN. 116 (1978).
138 See sources cited supra notes 121-22, and sources cited therein. There is
fierce debate over the proper methodology for these studies. See, e.g., Hamilton,
The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values:
A Theoretical Comment, 84 J. POL. EcoN. 647 (1976); Reinhard, Estimating
Property Tax Capitalization: A Further Comment, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 1251 (1981).
A less formal study is G. Mrr=n, CrriFs BY CONThACT: Tim PoLrncs oF
Muuc,'AL INcOROPRATiON 8 (1981), which presents anecdotal evidence that
middle-class families voted with their feet in the 1954-78 period among cities in
Los Angeles County. See also Gramlich & Rubinfeld, Micro Estimates of Public
Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hy-
pothesis, 90 J. POL. EcoN. 536 (1982) (reporting interview data that lend support
to Tiebout Hypotheses).
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gests that the members could also plausibly regard residency as a
desirable qualification for voting. At bottom, while the Tiebout
literature certainly does not provide support for a national rule
that would require local governments to confer voting rights only
on landowners, it also casts doubt on the wisdom of the current
national rule that essentially forces all local governments to treat
residency as a necessary and sufficient qualification for voting.
3. The Role of Local Government in Redistribution
As noted earlier, its perfectly voluntary nature makes a private
association an inappropriate instrument for accomplishing coercive
redistributions of wealth. 39 A city, however, has involuntary mem-
bers and therefore can better implement coercive redistributive
policies. That a city could effect redistribution, however, does not
establish that it should. This section describes the redistributive
role that public-finance theorists would currently assign to cities.
The mainstream position, certain to dismay Professor Laurence
Tribe and other Avery supporters, 140 is that local governments
should essentially have no role in income redistribution. In their
leading textbook on public finance, Professors Richard and Peggy
Musgrave say flatly, "Policies to adjust the distribution of income
among individuals must be conducted on a nationwide basis." 141
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations also
would assign redistributive activity to supralocal levels; it has recom-
mended that the states assume all responsibility for financing public
schools and that the federal government bear the entire cost of
public assistance.
1 42
These centralists offer several justifications for their conclu-
sions. First, they assert that a city's redistributive programs typi-
cally generate benefit spillovers that help outsiders. For example,
if Miami fed and clothed a flood of refugees, it would be relieving
a problem also of concern to non-Miamians. Whenever such benefit
spillovers occur from a city activity, public-finance scholars suggest,
a city is likely to carry out too little of that activity. The scholars'
139 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
140 See L. TiME, supra note 96, § 13-11, at 765; § 16-56, at 1132-34 (criticiz-
ing Supreme Court's tolerance of local voting rules that are unlikely to "upset
existing wealth distributions").
141 R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUsGRAVE, PnuLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AN) IIACTIcE
623 (2d ed. 1976); see also R. BisH, THE Punlac ECONOMY OF METROPOLrTAN
AEAs 141, 147 (1971); W. OATEs, FiscAL FEDERAUSM 7-8, 14 (1972).
142 See ADvisorY COmVm'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AID TO
LocAL GOVERNMENT Vi (1969).
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solution is to assign the activity to a government whose boundaries
are sufficiently inclusive to internalize all benefits. 143
Second, public-finance theorists assert that, when the benefits
and burdens of redistributive programs vary by location, both the
rich and the poor may move to exploit these locational differences.
If New York City's welfare benefits were to be better than Miami's,
for example, more of Miami's poor families might move to New
York than otherwise.'4 The centralists assert that these moves
would result in locational inefficiencies that would not be present
if uniform welfare benefits were administered nationally. 145
Pauly and other revisionists assert that they have detected a
shortcoming in the mainstream position.146 Pauly points out that
the utility-interdependence of the rich and poor may have a spatial
dimension. In less technical terms, a rich person may have more
interest in redistributing wealth to poor persons who live close by
than to those who live farther away. Charity drives, for example,
often focus on local causes. In his turn, a poor person may get
more satisfaction from receiving aid from a rich neighbor than
from someone more remote. However, because the revisionists
agree with the centralists that local redistributive programs may
artificially stimulate households to move, the revisionists would not
necessarily regard all redistributive activity at the local level as
being efficiency-enhancing. Rather, the revisionists argue that the
143 See, e.g., G. BaaAx, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS 3N THE UNITED
STATES passim (1967); B. NETzER, STATE-LocAL FINANCE AND INTERGOVERN-
mENTAL FscAL RELATIONS passim (1969).
144 This problem is hardly fanciful. Between March 1975 and March 1980,
45.1% of Americans age five and older moved to a new residence. San Francisco
Chron., Jan. 14, 1982, § 1, at 12, col. 1 (citing census bureau report). Between
1947 and 1975, each year an average of 12.8% of the population moved intra-
county, and another 6.5%, intercounty. See Rossi, Residential Mobility, in Do
HousING ALLoWANcEs WORK? 147, 153 (1981).
Tenants move more often than owner-occupants do. Id. 154. In a typical
metropolitan housing market, each year the number of tenant turnovers is almost
half the number of rental housing units. See RAND, TrRmD ANNUAL REPORT OF
Tm HousING ASSISTANCE SUPPLY EXPERIMENT 64-65 (1977) (reporting turnover
rates of 43 per hundred in Brown County, Wisconsin, and 50 per hundred in St.
Joseph County, Indiana).
See generally A. DowNs, Nmicinonssoons AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 24-36
(1981).
145 See, e.g., B. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 141, at 623.
146 See Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. PUB. EcoN.
35 (1973); see also A. BRETON & A. SCOTT, THE ECONoMIC CONSTIrnION OF
FEDERAL STATES 111-130 (1978); Buchanan, Who Should Distribute What in a
Federal System?, in REDISTIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 22 (1974). But see
Ladd & Doolittle, Which Level of Government Should Assist the Poor?, 35 NAT'L
TAx J. 323, 330-32 (1982) (empirically based critique of the revisionist position).
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question of optimal governmental responsibility for redistribution
is less clearcut than the mainstream theorists assert it to be.1 47
In designing voting systems for local governments, one must
of course consider not only the theory of redistribution, but also
current redistributive practice. There are few data on the magni-
tude of public assistance programs of subcounty governments, ap-
parently because these programs are rare.148 Local governments
nevertheless certainly do accomplish a considerable amount of re-
distribution. For example, a school district that spends equal dol-
lars per pupil ostensibly transfers wealth from richer to poorer
families. But this equal-expenditure policy is essentially a product
of state and federal law,149 and as such could be enforced regardless
of how a local school board happened to be elected. Local govern-
ments that voluntarily redistribute wealth in a significant way
mostly do so through their land-use regulations 50 For example,
by imposing exactions on developers, a city can transfer wealth from
owners of undeveloped land (and perhaps from housing consumers)
to current homeowners and others who own already developed
land.' 51 These ad hoc redistributive efforts of course hardly ac-
complish the broad progressive redistributions that public-finance
theorists have traditionally favored.
C. Toward Greater Community Choice Among Voting Rules
Several commentators have noted the incongruity between vot-
ing by economic stake in homeowners associations and voting by
residency in cities.152  Some of them would eliminate this incon-
gruity by extending the one-resident/one-vote rule to private
147Noneconomists have sometimes advocated local redistributive programs.
See, e.g., Krumholz, The Cleveland Policy Planning Report, 41 J. Am. INsT.
PLAmNEs 298 (1975) (Cleveland's top priority should be "promoting a wider
range of choices for those Cleveland residents who have few, if any, choices").
14
8
1n fiscal year 1980, local governments (including counties) financed 4.3%
of total public welfare expenditures. Ladd & Doolittle, supra note 146, at 324.
149See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd in
part and appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973). See generally Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform
Litigation: A Commentary 1977 D=rE L.J. 1099.
150 Rent control is another local program that may have major redistributive
consequences. See supra note 135.
151 See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YA E L.J. 385, 435-440, 450-54 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Suburban Growth
Controls].
152 See, e.g., Note, supra note 40, at 656-58; Note, supra note 100, at 402-12
(1969).
[Vol. 130:1519
CITIES AND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
governments as a matter of constitutional law.15  They advocate
that courts hold that the actions of homeowners associations con-
stitute state action for equal protection purposes, on the ground
either that associations perform "public functions" or that states
cannot delegate community governance to "private" organizations.
A few state courts have even begun to tilt in that direction.154 I
also favor substantial equalization of the legal constraints on cities
and associations when they choose among electoral systems. Un-
like these other commentators, however, I urge that this equaliza-
tion be accomplished by providing greater choice among voting
systems to the founders of both cities and homeowners associations.
1. More Choices for Homeowners Associations
Many states have enacted condominium and planned-com-
munity statutes that narrowly limit how developers can allocate
voting power in the associations they create. 55 Often these statutes
specify that votes must be allocated to owners according to a par-
ticular formula that attempts to measure the owners' original eco-
nomic stakes. The drafters of these statutes must assume that
consumers lack the capacity to evaluate alternative electoral systems
when shopping for units. This is an odd assumption in a society
that relies on private markets to allocate housing. If housing con-
sumers are incapable of assessing alternatives, shouldn't the state
also precisely dictate the floor plans of buildings and the substance
of private architectural controls?
Even someone who believes that merchants regularly exploit
consumers would probably be critical of these statutory straitjackets.
The recent developments in economic theory reviewed in the prior
section suggest both that there is unlikely to be any single optimal
voting system for communities and, more importantly, that if there
is such a system, no one yet knows what it is. I therefore recom-
mend that state legislatures remove all statutory constraints on the
selection of homeowners-association voting systems. A legislature
not willing to try total deregulation could adopt intermediate re-
forms. It could authorize developers to choose a voting system
153 See Walter, Condominium Government: How Should the Laws Be Changed?,
4 REAL EST. L.J. 141 (1975). But see Reichman, supra note 7, at 304-06.
154 See, e.g., Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979). But cf.
Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136
(1981) (there is "considerable doubt" that an association's actions constitute state
action). See generally sources cited in Note, supra note 40, at 656-57 nn. 47-54.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
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from a state-prepared list of alternative voting systems. Alterna-
tively, for a somewhat greater measure of freedom of contract, it
could also authorize a developer to choose an unlisted voting system
provided that a state administrative agency certified that the system
met a statutory standard of "reasonableness."
If legislatures permitted the market for private voting systems
to flower, developers might experiment with now forbidden tech-
niques. For example, a developer might specify that an owner's
relative voting power would not be fixed in proportion to the
original market values set out in the declaration, but would be
periodically recalculated according to reassessed market values.
More ambitiously, an association's rules could call for use of the
Groves-Ledyard mechanism 156 or other innovations to decide certain
issues. As a last example, most states currently forbid tenants from
voting on association matters. A developer could conceivably be-
lieve that enfranchising tenants would raise the rental value (and
hence the sale price) of his units.157 Thus, if allowed more choice
among private voting systems, some creators of private associations
might experiment with one-resident/one-vote or other rules involv-
ing tenant voting.
158
2. More Choices for Cities
The recent developments in economic theory also support a
more controversial recommendation: that the Supreme Court over-
rule Avery (and related decisions) to eliminate the current federal
constitutional requirement that local elections be conducted on a
one-resident/one-vote basis.159 (I should immediately add that I
endorse the federal constitutional rule of one-resident/one-vote in
state and federal elections, partly because those higher-level govern-
ments are necessarily more involved than local ones in progressive
redistributive activity.)
Although Avery is often viewed as bedrock constitutional law,
some Justices have never accepted the extension of the one-resident/
156 See supra text accompanying note 114.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 131-38.
158 The presence of both a taking clause, see supra text accompanying notes
62-77, and a unanimity requirement for a change in assessment shares, see supra
text accompanying notes 51-53, would somewhat allay purchasers' fears that a one-
resident/one-vote system would cause an association to pursue coerced redistribu-
tions of wealth.
159 For other academic commentary critical of the Avery line of decisions, see
Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer v. Union Free
School District No. 15, 15 AR=z. L. REv. 457 (1973); see also A. BicIKL, TssE
SU1'EMM COURT AND TRE IDEA OF PROGRES s 163-66 (1978); Casper, Apportion-
ment and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
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one-vote rule to local elections. Justice Harlan couched the open-
ing words of his dissent in Avery in the strongest possible terms:
"I could not disagree more with this decision . *.".." 160 Thirteen
years later, Justice Powell hinted that he stood ready to reconsider
the Avery line of decisions.' 61 If the Court observed its usual
cautions, it would probably chip away at Avery before overruling it.
If an appropriate case came before it, the Court could start by
overruling Kolodziejski, thereby resurrecting a state's option to
limit eligibility to vote in local general-obligation bond elections
to persons the state plausibly perceived as having an interest in
the long-term economic condition of the community.162 As another
intermediate step, the Court could exempt from the Avery rule not
only narrow special districts, but also small general-purpose local
governments that have close substitutes. When a small suburb
must compete vigorously with many other suburbs for residents, it
is unlikely to try much progressive redistribution because the high
mobility of the regional population would cause many of the bene-
fits of the redistribution to spill out to others in the region.
63
(New York City tried a tuition-free city university; Scarsdale never
did.) To the extent that the Justices who supported Avery did so
to foster progressive redistributive activity, they could rather pain-
lessly exempt from the rule small local governments in areas of
high population mobility.'6
My reasons for doubting the soundness of Avery should by
now be apparent. Different voting systems accord different weight
to the competing interests of allocative efficiency, administrative
efficiency, progressive redistribution, and participation. 165 Avery
dictates that cities use a particular voting system as a matter of
national law. It thus prevents subnational governments whose
members weigh these competing interests differently than the Court
160 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
161 See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 373 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring)
(Court should allow experimentation with local political structures and rely on
state legislatures elected in compliance with one-person/one-vote rule to police this
experimentation).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
163 See supra text accompanying note 143.
164 Although the best test of a political unit's "smallness" is the presence of
good substitutes, this test is not readily applied. Rather than use this performance
standard, the Court might therefore choose to employ population or land area, or
a combination of the two, see infra note 178, as a yardstick for measuring the size
of a local government.
165 See supra text accompanying notes 78-84
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weighs them from experimenting with other mechanisms for com-
munity decisionmaking.
Avery limits the choices of both states and cities.'66 State legis-
latures specify the procedures, including the voting rules, that local
citizens are to follow when forming a new local government. If
state legislators were mainly concerned about administrative effi-
ciency and maximizing progressive redistribution at the local level,
they might indeed choose the one-resident/one-vote rule for incor-
poration proceedings. On the other hand, particularly if the state
itself did a lot of redistributing, the state legislators might give
more weight to other interests. They might conclude, for example,
that voting by economic stake would better reflect intensities of
preference, and thus be more likely to promote allocative effi-
ciency.16 7 They might also conclude (ironically for the critical legal
scholars) that voting by economic stake better identifies the persons
whose lives would be most affected by incorporation, and who would
thus gain the most from the experience of participating in an in-
corporation election.
Avery constrains not only how states allocate votes in city in-
corporation proceedings, but also how cities run post-incorporation
elections. The limitation on city choices is a major inroad on local
autonomy. For example, it is conceivable that even community
members who employed a one-resident/one-vote rule when decid-
ing to incorporate would also decide by the same procedure to
adopt a charter that allocated votes in post-incorporation elections
according to some other system. Like the state legislators who
rather consistently disenfranchise tenants in condominium elections,
local citizens could plausibly read the capitalization literature 168
as indicating that short-term tenants as a class have less stake in
community decisions than owners of local land do. They might
therefore reject the one-resident/one-vote rule in favor of a property-
ownership qualification for voting,169 or even in favor of some
166 Several Court majority opinions have emphasized the desirability of flexi-
bility in local political arrangements. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for
Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 269-70 (1977); Abate
v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971); Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105,
109 (1967).
167A California statute once authorized owners of a majority of the assessed
valuation of land in the relevant area to veto an incorporation proceeding. Citing
the Avery line of decisions, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that
the statute violated the equal protection clause. See Curtis v. Board of Super-
visors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 501 P.2d 537, 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1972).
168 See supra text accompanying notes 119-38.
169 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684-86 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (historical review of property qualifications for voting).
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system that weighted votes by acreage or property value.'70 Alter
natively, local incorporators might emphasize the goal of progressive
income redistribution. They could then point to the findings of
incomplete capitalization in the same literature as a plausible justi-
fication for giving more per capita voting power to tenants than to
homeowners. Their reasons would be that tenants do have some
stake in local outcomes, and are apt to be poorer than persons who
own real property. Avery denies local incorporators the option of
employing any of these unorthodox voting systems.
The Supreme Court may have believed that Avery and its
progeny would more progressively distribute voting power in local
elections, and therefore increase progressive redistribution by cities.
Especially in light of the current controversy about whether local
governments should have any role in income redistribution, 171 the
Court should abandon its implicit emphasis on redistribution,
which is, after all, only one of the interests at stake when a com-
munity chooses a voting system. So long as the Court has assured
that voting power is properly distributed at the state level, the
Court should let state legislators and state courts decide whether
local electoral systems must be structured to maximize progressive
redistribution. 72
In addition, the Court may not have recognized that in some
situations the one-resident/one-vote rule may lead to more regres-
sive results than voting by economic stake would. I invoke the
example of exclusionary zoning The. main discretionary business
of a suburban government is land-use control. Avery entitles a
suburb's current homeowners and other residents to vote, but seems
to forbid voting by both nonresidents who might want to move to
the suburb and nonresidents who own land in the suburb. Partly
as a consequence of this allocation of political power, suburbs tend
to employ their land-use controls to maximize the wealth of current
homeowners.17 3 Suburbs not only impose exactions on developers
to capture part of the value of undeveloped land, but also (where
possible) limit housing production to drive housing prices above
competitive levels. These policies transfer wealth from future
housing consumers to owners of existing housing units and are pre-
170 Some states have used these apportionment systems in annexation proceed-
ings, for example. See supra note 130.
17' See supra text accompanying notes 139-51.
172See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 372 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 639 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). But see id. 628-30; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481
(1968); L. TamE, supra note 96, § 13-11, at 765; § 16-56, at 1132-34.
173 See generally Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 151.
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sumptively inefficient in Kaldor-Hicks terms-that is, current hous-
ing owners gain less than consumers, and owners of undeveloped
land, lose. 1' 4 If there were no constitutional barrier to enfranchis-
ing affected nonresident consumers -17 and landowners, states and
local incorporators could perhaps structure local electoral systems
to give these nonresidents more political influence, thereby reduc-
ing the frequency of regressive exclusionary practices.
To underscore this point, suppose that voting power in a sub-
urb were to be reallocated from one-vote-per-resident to one-vote-
per-acre. That reallocation would strengthen prodevelopment
forces relative to antidevelopment forces because owners of unde-
veloped land would gain in political power. Assume more housing
would be built. If exclusionary practices had previously pushed
housing prices above competitive levels, housing prices would fall.
It is possible that the gains low-income families would obtain from
the drop in housing prices would outweigh other losses they would
sustain from residing in a suburb that conferred voting power ac-
cording to a formula that was facially disadvantageous to them.1'76
In other words, an apparently regressive voting system may have
progressive distributional consequences.
How best to organize a municipal political system is currently
far from clear. The Supreme Court should therefore refrain from
rendering decisions that prohibit virtually all state and local ex-
perimentation in local voting mechanisms. The Supreme Court
itself presaged the public-choice literature when it noted in Ander-
son v. Dunn over a century ago: "The science of government is
... the science of experiment." 177
174 See id. 435-36.
175 There are enormous practical difficulties in identifying affected nonresident
consumers. Commentators who have concluded that nonresident consumers are
constitutionally entitled to a voice in shaping suburban land-use policy have there-
fore suggested that courts simply declare that the present zoning system violates
the equal protection clause, on the assumption that state legislatures would then
replace or supplement local zoning with a system of state or regional land-use
controls. Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896, 924
(1970). For a description of recent efforts to assure a consumer voice in ad-
ministrative decisionmaking, see Morone & Marmor, Representing Consumer In-
terests: The Case of American Health Planning, 91 ETmcs 431 (1981).
176 How a city allocates voting power should arguably vary according to the
stage of municipal development. During the early life of a homeowners associa-
tion, the developer is typically granted three votes per unit to protect against the
possibility that the first residents might raise the ante for entry. See supra note 101
and accompanying text. The original incorporators of a city might similarly (1)
choose for the city's developing stage a voting system (such as one-acre/one-vote)
that protects late developers, but also (2) schedule an eventual switch to another
voting system (such as one-resident/one-vote).
177 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821).
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My recommendation that the Supreme Court overrule Avery
implies neither that the Court has no role in supervising how states
structure local political arrangements nor that state courts and legis-
latures should place no bounds on the structuring of municipal
voting systems. 178  The Court can properly insist that the allocation
and weighting of votes at the local level accord with some plausible
theory of popular government. Moreover, the Supreme Court re-
tains its role in assuring that incumbents do not manipulate dis-
tricting and other decisions to malapportion voting power away
from the pattern originally intended.179 Yet these caveats do not
weaken the central thesis: that the Supreme Court should allow the
states some freedom in deciding how votes are allocated in local
elections.
IV. DoES LEGAL DOCTRINE DISFAVOR CITIES?:
A CRITIQUE OF The City as a Legal Concept
In his recent article, Professor Frug asserted that legal rules
currently prevent cities from engaging in the normal range of busi-
ness activities and deny cities any inherent right to resist inter-
vention by the state. These rules have made cities "powerless." .80
Frug is distressed that current law "prefer[s] corporations to cities
as vehicles for decentralized power." 181 As Frug perceives the situ-
ation, private corporations tend to be hierarchical, rather than
democratic, in structure. This characteristic usually disables a pri-
vate organization from serving as a vehicle for group fulfillment
and as an intermediary between the individual and the state. Al-
though Frug himself sees much value in intermediaries (quite
rightly, in my view), he perceives "liberalism"-that is, the world
178Before Avery occupied the field in 1968, some state supreme courts were
beginning to restructure local political systems on constitutional grounds. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857, 46 Cal. Rptr. 617
(1965) (ordering reapportionment of districts used to elect county supervisors,
apparently on the authority of the federal equal protection clause).
As a state legislator, I myself would favor a state statute or state constitutional
provision that required all local governments above a certain size in either area
(36 square miles?) or population (20,000?) to entitle all residents to vote in
elections for local offices.
179 In Avery itself, the Midland County electoral districts were grossly mal-
apportioned. See Avery, 390 U.S. at 476. I agree with Avery's narrow holding
that, because the county had adopted a one-resident/one-vote rule, this apportion-
ment violated the equal protection clause. I of course strongly disagree with the
Court's implicit broader holding in Avery that all elections conducted by general-
purpose local governments must be conducted on a one-resident/one-vote basis.
180 Frug, supra note 1, at 1059, 1074, 1119.
181 Id. 1061.
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view of most Western thinkers-as being hostile to the creation of
buffers between citizen and state.
For Frug, the Western world is out of joint. He concludes
his ambitious article with these words: "[Wje need a basic rethink-
ing of liberalism and then a restructuring of our society itself." 182
Like most critical legal thinkers, Frug describes what he does not
like about the current scene more concretely than he describes what
a "restructured" American society would look like after the proper
"rethinking." However, he does identify some initial reforms that
would promote true decentralization and "public freedom," 183
namely, city establishment of public banks, insurance companies,
and retail food outlets.184 Frug believes cities have rarely under-
taken these sorts of enterprises because current legal doctrine pre-
vents cities from engaging in business activities.
In this Part, I discuss my three major disagreements with
Frug's analysis. They deal in turn with his perceptions (1) of how
best to identify legal phenomena, (2) of the relative merits of public
and private intermediaries, and (3) of the reality of current legal
doctrine.
A. The Hypothesized Liberal Attack on Intermediaries
As one whom the critical legal scholars would be certain to
characterize as a Prisoner of Liberal Thought, I was puzzled to
discover that Frug and I fervently agree on one important point:
the desirability of nurturing intermediary institutions between the
individual and the state. Why, I wondered, should Frug have
thought that non-critical scholars would want to "attack" 18 or
"undermine" 186 the city, the family, and the private association?
In the style of many of his critical compatriots, 187 Frug relies
more on deductive reasoning than on observation to discover the
asserted liberal attack on intermediaries. His deductive syllogism
starts with his definition of liberalism. Frug views liberals as hav-
ing two fundamental outlooks: (1) a dedication to reason and (2) a
perception that the world poses numerous complex dualities.188
182 Id. 1154; see also id. 1060.
183See H. ARNDT, supra note 79, at 115-16, 120-29.
184 Frug, supra note 1, at 1128, 1150-52.
185 Id. 1121.
186 Id. 1126.
187 See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrIcs 72-76 (1975).
188 See Frug, supra note 1, at 1074-75. The liberal perception of these dual-
ities is taken as a given, not as something to be verified. One thus cannot ask
why liberal thought should be characterized by dualities as opposed to, say,
eternal triangles.
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One of these dualities is that between the individual and the state.
Frug deduces that liberal thinkers are conceptually bound to this
duality, and thus discomforted by the existence of intermediate
institutions that are hard to classify at either pole. This leads to
"the liberal undermining of intermediate entities." 1s9
As an empiricist, I predictably respond that the question of
whether anyone is systematically undermining the city, the family,
or any other intermediary is better answered by inductive methods
than by the stipulation of nonverifiable "dualities" and the deduc-
tion of consequences that logically follow. 9 0 In part of his article,
Frug does persuasively and impressively document the decline in
city powers between medieval times and the early twentieth
century.' 9 ' Yet this historical evidence hardly proves the existence
of a current liberal attack on intermediaries.
First, as will soon be demonstrated, since the early twentieth
century, changes in legal doctrines have considerably expanded the
powers of cities. 92  Frug makes almost no mention of these legal
developments. Second, the American society that Frug wants to
rethink and restructure currently contains within it a broad array
of intermediaries: religious groups, business firms, labor unions,
social clubs, professional associations, universities, and on and on. 93
New types of intermediaries-for example, the homeowners asso-
ciation-are continually emerging. To be sure, some voices regu-
larly attack the independence of these entities. At the same time,
other (unquestionably "liberal") voices defend them. 94 The situa-
tion is sufficiently complex that a sound understanding of the cur-
rent role of intermediaries is more likely to come from observation
than from the armchair application of abstract dualities.
289 Id. 1126.
190 1 might note that empirical methods have dominated American legal thought
in this century. See Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century
American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General
Theory About Law and Its Uses, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861, 880-81 (1981).
191 See Frug, supra note 1, at 1080-1120.
192 See infra text accompanying notes 210-31.
193 An early commentator on American society was struck by the abundance
of intermediary institutions. See 2 A. DE TocQuEvLLE, D)EmocAcy iN AssaucA
129-46 (H. Reeve trans. 1898). "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all
dispositions, constantly form associations." Id. 129.
194 See, e.g., P. BERGER & R. NEuHAus, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THlE RorE OF
MEDrATmG STRucTREs iN PuBLic po LIcy (1980); Novak, Mediating Institutions:
The Communitarian Individual in America, PuB. INTEREST, Summer 1982, at 3.
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B. The Inexplicable Preference for "Public" Intermediaries
At the end of his article, Frug compares two possible vehicles
for the exercise of decentralized power: the business corporation
and the city.1' 5 Although he claims to be showing only that the
two are equally qualified, he clearly prefers the public form. This
preference leads naturally to his advocacy of city entry into the
banking and insurance industries 96
Frug's discussion is not persuasive. First, Frug intentionally
bypasses the existing social science literature on the relative effi-
ciency of public and private organizations on the ground that these
entities currently operate under different legal rules.197 This as-
sumes social scientists could not control for legal differences (such
as the civil service system) and wrongly implies that all legal dif-
ferences favor the corporation. Second, the business corporation
Frug describes resembles a candidate for Fortune's 500.198 Frug
refers to "the currently hierarchical, massively centralized corpo-
rate structure" 199 and assumes that shareholders are "strangers"
lacking "some real relationship." 200 Frug assumes a city will usually
be small enough to serve as a site for true participatory democracy. 201
This stacked comparison leads to the unsurprising conclusion that
the resident of a small city has a better chance of controlling his
organization than does a shareholder in a large corporation.
Had he compared a small corporation and a large city, how-
ever, Frug might well have shown more enthusiasm for corpora-
195 See Frug, supra note 1, at 1141-49.
196 This recommendation stems from Frug's interest in the amorphous goal of
"public freedom." Frug does not invoke conventional economic theory to defend
public enterprise. For others' efforts along those lines, see W. SBEPHErD, Ptnrac
ENTERPRISE: EcONomic ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE (1976) (especially at
185-204, a discussion of public banking); Prichard & Trebilcock, Crown Corpora-
tions: The Calculus of Instrument Choice, in CROWN CORPORATIONS IN CANADA
(J. Richard ed. 1983).
19 7 See Frug, supra note 1, at 1143. Empirical studies support the proposition
that private firms tend to be more efficient than government agencies in providing
specific services. Some leading studies are reviewed in Spann, Public versus
Private Provision of Governmental Services, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE
SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 71 (T. Borcherding ed. 1977). See also
Sonstelie, The Welfare Cost of Free Public Schools, 90 J. POL. ECON. 794 (1982)
(reporting data that indicate that private schools are more efficient than public
schools).
198 According to one estimate, 90% of U.S. corporations have ten or fewer share-
holders, and over 99%, one hundred or fewer. In 1971, only 71 corporations had
over 100,000 shareholders. A. CoNARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 116-17 n.36
(1976).
199 Frug, supra note 1, at 1142.
200 Id. 1147.
201 See id. 1148-49.
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tions as intermediaries between citizen and state. Homeowners
associations are territorially circumscribed organizations that tend
to be much smaller than cities. Because they are smaller, they are
less hierarchically organized. Compared to city residents, associa-
tion members are more likely to share "real relationships" and to
have genuine opportunities to participate in the decisions that affect
their lives. At bottom Frug's analysis points only to the desirability
of decentralizing power to small organizations.202 He therefore
should regard the homeowners association as generally superior to
the city as an intermediary between state and individual. Despite
his herculean research, Frug's article never mentions the home-
owners association.
City establishment of banks and insurance companies would
also be a highly inexact way to achieve Frug's own goals. The
agglomeration of multiple functions under the umbrella of a single
organization is often a move toward centralization, not away from
it. For example, some social critics oppose conglomerate mergers
between business corporations simply because of the alleged social
disadvantages of bigness.203  There are almost as many different
banking companies in the United States as there are municipali-
ties.204 Allowing a person to patronize a small bank in a large city
enables him to decentralize the power of the institutions that affect
his life.
The recent history of the public school system should give
Frug pause. Proponents of education vouchers believe that a
greater role for private providers of educational services would
increase, not decrease, parental freedom.20 The anecdotal evidence
I have indicates that parents are less frustrated by, and participate
more actively in, the governance of private schools than in the
202 Frug asserts that his preference is for democratic, rather than hierarchical,
organizations. Id. As the text suggests, I perceive that the nature of an organiza-
tion depends more on its size than on whether it is a "city" or a "corporation."
See also D. MuELTER, supra note 49, at 15-17; M. OrsoN, supra note 6, at 16-52
(discussing advantages of small organizations).
203 See, e.g., Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. Rzv.
1051 (1979).
20
41n 1977, there were 3,042 counties, 18,862 municipalities, and 16,822
townships in the U.S. In the same year, there were 14,671 commercial banks (with
34,578 different branches), 4,761 savings and loan associations, 467 mutual savings
banks, and 12,750 state or federally chartered credit unions. BUEAu OF THE
CENsus, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERcE, STATISTICA.L ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
309, 532, 536-37 (1980).
205 See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PuBLic PoLcY, EDUCATION VoucERts: A
REPORT ON FINANCING ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BY GRANTS TO PARENTS (1970);
J. CooNs & S. SucA&N, FAMILY CHOICE In EDUCATION: A MODEL STATE SYSTEM
FOR VoUCHERs (1971).
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governance of public schools. 20G I would guess their greater satis-
faction stems from both the smaller size of private schools and the
incentive structure (market competition) that disciplines managers
of private institutions.
20 7
C. Are Cities Really So Powerless?
Frug's central factual premise is that American cities are power-
less, at least in comparison to private corporations. His historical
research does show cities losing power up to the early part of this
century. Yet history for Frug inexplicably stops in about 1910-
near the high-water mark of legal restrictions on the powers of all
levels of American government. Yet since 1910, legal restrictions
on city powers have been considerably relaxed, and new legal dis-
tinctions-especially some in the Internal Revenue Code-now give
cities major countervailing advantages in competing with home-
owners associations and other private entities.
1. The Power of Cities to Engage in Business Enterprises
Does current legal doctrine in fact bar cities from opening
banks and insurance companies, Frug's proposed initial experiments
in "public freedom"? Frug writes that "municipalities may not
engage in any 'business' activity unless it falls under the heading
of a 'public utility,' and is not for profit." 208 His sole source for
this proposition is Michelman and Sandalow's influential casebook
on local government law. However, on the page Frug cites, Michel-
man and Sandalow refer to the rule against city business activities
as a "venerable maxim" that one finds in "e.g., 3 Dillon, Municipal
Corporations §§ 977, 1291 (5th ed. 1911)." 209 Post-1911 legal de-
velopments show Frug's assertions of city "powerlessness" to be
greatly exaggerated.
206 An evaluator of the Alum Rock, Cal., voucher experiment concluded that
"the Alum Rock experience seems to support strongly the voucher model premise
that parents want to influence school decisions, and that the introduction of
vouchers will increase parental interest in school decision making." Bridges,
Parental Decision Making in an Education Voucher System (paper presented at
Am. Educational Research Ass'n annual meeting, Chicago, April 1974), quoted in
J. LnrDLow, EDUCATiONAL VoucHaEs 48 (1980).
207 The 1981 California Opinion Index poll found that California adults ranked
"the public school system" 32nd out of 34 public and private institutions studied
in terms of "degree of confidence." "Banks" were ranked 14th; "local government,"
15th; and "insurance companies," 27th. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 18, 1981, § 1,
at 4, col. 3.
208 Frug, supra note 1, at 1065.
209 F. MiCHELMAN & T. SANDALow, supra note 19, at 103.
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First, during the twentieth century, state grants of power "to
cities have become more and more generous. Dillon's Rule,.which
required courts to construe strictly all state statutory delegations of
power to cities, was widely accepted in 1910. Today it is a dead
letter in many states.210 More significantly, over the past few
decades more and more states have conferred broad home-rule
powers on certain of their cities. The home-rule movement has
not only given cities new powers, but has also created in them an
(admittedly limited) right to resist state interference in their "local"
or "municipal" affairs.
211
Second, state courts have considerably altered their interpreta-
tion of the constitutional and statutory texts that they once invoked
to limit city business activities. In 'most states the key limitations
have been state constitutional provisions that forbid cities from
spending tax and bond revenues for other than "public pur-
poses." 212 These constitutional doctrines continue to have some bite
in most states, but less and less bite as the years pass.213 Cities now
rarely lose lawsuits that challenge their power to engage in business
210See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1118-27 (Utah 1980) (dis-
approving Dillon's Rule by name, and citing Frog, supra note 1, as authority);
IOWA CONsT. art. 3, § 38A; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7," ff 11 (a city's statutory powers
are to be liberally construed). But see, e.g., City of Osceola v. Whistle, 241 Ark.
604, 410 S.W.2d 393 (1966); Tabler v. Board of Supervisors, 221 Va. 200, 269
S.E.2d 358 (1980). See generally D. MANDEL=ER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND
LocAL GoyERNMENT 3N A FEDERAL SysTmr. 148-78 (1977).
2 1 lForty states now have constitutional provisions that delegate power to
local governments in general terms. (This is twice the number of states that bad
constitutional home-rule in 1953. See D. MANDELER & D. NETsCH, supra note
210, at 179, 185.) Additional states confer home-rule powers by statute. Courts
have tended to construe generously the home-rule powers of cities. See, e.g.,
Marshall Field & Co. v. Village of South Barrington, 92 Ill. App. 3d 360, 362-63,
415 N.E.2d 1277, 1279-80 (1981) ("Prior to the adoption of the 1970 Constitution,
the power and authority of municipal entities were governed by what is commonly
referred to as Dillon's Rule. . . . The 1970 Constitution radically altered this
relationship of municipalities to the state by introducing the concept of home
rule."); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for
the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 663 (1964). See generally D. MANDELRER &
D. NEscH, supra note 210, at 179-216.
Frug makes but passing mention of the home-rule movement. See Frog,
supra note 1, at 1062-63.
212 See generally F. MNcHmm-'s & T. SANDALOW, supra note 19, at 36-39.
2 13 See 2 E. McQm.LEN, THE LAw OF MUNiCnAL ComIonAnoNs § 10.31 (3rd
ed. 1979) ("The modem trend of the decisions is to extend the class of public uses
or purposes in considering the municipal activities sought to be included therein.");
56 Am. JuR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 210, at 269 (1971) ("More recent cases,
although reasserting the rule, indicate a tendency to broaden the scope of those
activities which may be classed as involving a public purpose in which a municipal
corporation may lawfully engage."); Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on
Public Industrial Financing:-An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA.
L. Rsv. 265, 293-96 (1963).
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activities that deviate from the public-utility paradigm.2 14 Frug's
"powerless" local governments currently develop housing com-
plexes,215 retail stores,2 16 office buildings, 217 sports stadiums, 218 and
redevelopment projects.219 They rent tools; 220 own and operate
distant vacation resorts; 221 sell at retail products such as gasoline,
222
214 Some quotations will illustrate the standard of review applied by the more
deferential courts:
R. E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 338 (Minn. 1978):
ETlhe city, in implementing the powers delegated to it by the legislature,
is also vested with broad discretion in determining whether particular
projects will serve a public purpose. While such decisions are reviewable,
they can only be set aside if it is established that the city's action is
manifestly arbitrary and capricious because the projects primarily serve a
private interest.
State ex rel. Taft v. Campanella, 50 Ohio St. 2d 242, 244, 364 N.E.2d 21, 23,
24 (1977) (per curian) (legitimating county bonds issued to purchase a privately
owned hospital):
The modem trend is to expand and liberally construe the term 'public
use' in considering state and municipal activities sought to be brought
within its meaning ...
The determination of whether a use of bonds constitutes a public
purpose is primarily the function of the bond issuing authority, and will
be overruled by the courts only if manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.
215 Under the traditional public housing program, local housing authorities
design, build, and manage low-rent housing units. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437-1437j
(1978). There were 822,000 public housing units in 1969. See R. MuTHr, Poruc
HoUsING: AN EcoNoMIc EVALUATION 1 (1973).
216 See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Village of South Barrington, 92 Ill. App.
3d 360, 415 N.E.2d 1277 (1981) (department store located beyond city bound-
aries); Mayor & Members of the City Council v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 221 Va.
865, 275 S.E.2d 888 (1981) (K-Mart). In the usual instance, the city has a prior
commitment to lease or sell the facility to a private operator.21 7 See State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402 (1940); see
also Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190
N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
218 See, e.g., Alan v. County of Wayne, 388 Mich. 210, 317-23, 356-57, 200
N.W.2d 628, 680-83, 699, modified, 388 Mich. 626, 202 N.W.2d '277 (1972);
Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 753-55 (Minn.
1978) (disapproving Bums v. Essling, 156 Minn. 171, 194 N.W. 404 (1923)).
219 The well-known federal urban renewal program for a long time provided
funds to local redevelopment agencies. See Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, ch.
338, 63 Stat. 414 (repealed 1971). In many states, these agencies now obtain
funds through state systems of tax-increment financing. See, e.g., Richards v. City
of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975). See generally R. ELucKsoN & A.
TAnrocx, LAND-UsE CONTROLS 1002-13 (1981).
220 The city of Berkeley, Cal., has a program of this sort.
221 Since 1921, the city of Berkeley, Cal., has operated a summer recreation
camp just west of Yosemite National Park. The city of San Jose, Cal., operates
another camp nearby. San Francisco Chron., Oct. 29, 1981, § 1, at 2, col. 5; see
also Sabaugh v. City of Dearborn, 384 Mich. 510, 185 N.W.2d 363 (1971) (up-
holding Dearborn's purchase of apartment buildings in Florida for rental to city's
senior citizens).
222 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N.W. 172
(1926) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 275 U.S. 504 (1927) (city sales of gasoline and
oil do not violate due process rights of private sellers).
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liquor,223 light bulbs, 224 and sportswear; 225 and lend money to home-
buyers 226 and business enterprises. 227  In Arizona, a state more
rugged in its individualism than most, a constitutional provision
explicitly authorizes all cities "to engage in industrial pursuits." 228
Current mainstream economic theory, which would limit the role
of government to instances of market failure, seems today to have
little more constitutional relevance in most states than Herbert
Spencer's social statics.
Frug mentions the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment as a source of city powerlessness. He cites as authority Moore
v. City of East Cleveland.220 In Moore, the due process clause was
construed to prohibit a city from preventing a grandmother from
living with two grandchildren who were not siblings. Other
Supreme Court decisions are more relevant to the power of cities
to engage in business. Even during the Lochner era, the Supreme
Court repeatedly held that the due process clause did not prevent
states and cities from entering into businesses commonly carried
out by private enterprise. Perhaps the broadest holding came in
1920, when the Court in Green v. Frazier2 30 unanimously sustained
the constitutionality of a North Dakota statute that authorized the
223 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Allt, 25 Ariz. App. 565, 569, 545 P.2d 76, 80 (1976)
("[t]he fact that a municipal corporation may make a profit from engaging in a
proprietary activity does not negate the underlying public purpose of the enter-
prise').
224 The city of Huntington Woods, Mich., sells not only light bulbs, but fire
extinguishers, smoke detectors, and plastic garbage bags. Letter-to-the-editor from
Mark Wollenweber, City Manager, Huntington Woods, Michigan, Pun. MGC T.,
June 1981, at 12.
225 City pro shops at Mt. Lebanon, Pa., recreational facilities sell both sports
equipment and sports clothing. Wesemann, Innovative Revenue Sources: The
Entrepreneurial Municipality, PuB. MCMT., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 21, 22.
226 In 1978, cities first began floating tax-exempt bonds to fund below market-
rate home mortgages. By 1980, these local bond issues had soared to an annual
total of $5.5 billion. To stanch the drain on the federal treasury, Congress passed
the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2660.
The Act reduced the 1981 total to $1.8 billion. See PRESIDENT'S COmM'N ON
Hous., REPORT 169-71 (1982).
227 When a city issues tax-exempt industrial-revenue bonds, uses the proceeds
to build industrial facilities, and leases those facilities "at cost" to a private firm,
the city is essentially making a below-market-rate loan to the firm. See generally
Pinsky, supra note 213. According to one count, 42 states had affirmed the state
constitutionality of this practice by 1968. Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev.
Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968) (program would serve no "public
purpose" in North Carolina).
228 Am. CoNsT. art. 2, § 34.
229 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion), cited in Frug, supra note 1, at
1063 n.13.
230253 U.S. 233 (1920).
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establishment of state banks, state mills and grain elevators, state
homebuilding agencies, and other state enterprises. 231
Although the constitutional decisions are not what Frug's dia-
lectics predicted they would be, Frug correctly points out that
higher-level legislatures have recently been abusing city autonomy.
State and federal statutory directives, not to mention strings on
grants-in-aid, tightly restrict municipal choice in numerous in-
stances. Frug's factual premise, however, is that cities are powerless
compared to private corporations. This he does not prove. State
and federal regulation of business activity has also proceeded apace.
Although neither the city nor the corporation has much federal
constitutional protection against governmental intrusions, National
League of Cities v. Usery 232 suggests that of the two, cities can ex-
pect more sympathy from the Supreme Court. Corporations un-
ambiguously lack the powers of taxation, regulation, and eminent
domain that cities have. Cities have steadily expanded their ac-
tivities in recent years. From 1949 to 1977, while employment in
private industry increased by sixty-two percent, the number of
municipal employees increased by ninety-four percent. 233 Land
developers and builders would be startled by Frug's characterization
that cities are "powerless." American law simply does not prefer
corporations to cities as vehicles for decentralized power.
As luck would have it, at about the time Professor Frug's
article was published, prairie socialists in the city of Minot, North
Dakota, gathered enough signatures to place on the city ballot an
initiative measure calling for establishment of a city-owned bank.
(Because Minot already had four local banks as well as a variety
of other financial institutions, 23 4 one might wonder whether this
was truly a campaign that would decentralize power.) Unlike Frug,
both Minot city officials and the bank's proponents saw no serious
legal obstacles to this venture.235 Minot's city charter explicitly
231 See also Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 621
(1934); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917) (Maine statute authorizing
cities to sell heating fuels did not deprive taxpayers of due process).
232426 U.S. 833 (1976) (commerce clause gives federal government broader
power to regulate labor practices of private businesses than labor practices of state
and local governments).
233TAx FOUND., INc., FACTS AND FIGUREs ON GOVERNMENT FnANcE 24-25
(1979). The number of employees of local school districts increased by 276%
during the same period. Id. 25.
234 Ferris, City Owned Bank Derailed in ND, Am. BANKEa, June 5, 1981, at 2.
235 Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1981, at 31, col. 3 (quoting Professor Carl Kalvelage,
a major proponent of the initiative); telephone interview with Robert Schempp,
City Manager, City of Minot (Nov. 5, 1981).
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authorizes the city to engage in "any enterprise." 2386 Partly because
North Dakota has long operated a state bank (the only presently
viable one of its kind)2 37 no clause in either the North Dakota or
the federal constitution was seen as posing a serious legal barrier to
forming a city bank. Federal banking officials said. they had no
objection so long as Minot's bank would be financially sound.238
State banking officials did observe that North Dakota's banking
statutes specify that only "natural persons" canapply for a certificate
of authority to open a bank, and that a city would not qualify as a
natural person.23 9  Yet in the end, this technical barrier was seen
as readily circumvented; the city could use specific individuals as
agents to obtain the certificate, and those agents could then transfer
the certificate to whomever the city chose. 240
In sum, although there was some public debate over Minot's
power to engage in banking, the campaign centered on the merits
of the bank proposal. On April 21, 1981, the Minot electorate
voted down the initiative measure by a margin of five-to-one. 241
This result suggests that voter preferences, not legal barriers, better
explain the current absence of city banking in the United States.
2. Pro-City Biases in the Tax Structure
Frug did not compare the legal status of the city with that of
the homeowners association-the real alternative candidate for de-
centralized control of a residential community. Associations now
certainly enjoy some legal preferences. For example, associations
are exempt from civil service and public bidding requirements, and
from federal constitutional rules (such as Avery's) that apply only
when state action is present. On the other hand, many legal dis-
tinctions favor cities. To give some examples, a city may be im-
mune from tort and antitrust liability in situations where a corpo-
ration would not be.242 As administrators of private schools would
23GMinot, N.D., Home Rule Charter, art. 3, §j (1972); see also Flagstad,
Home-Rule Allows Bank; But How to Fund?, Minot (N.D.) Daily News, Jan. 12,
1981, at 1, col. 2.
2 37 See Flagstad, Expert Says Nothing to Prevent City Bank, Minot (N.D.)
Daily News, Dec. 23, 1980, at 7, col. 1; N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 6-09-01 to 6-09.2-11
(1975).
238 Minot (N.D.) Daily News, Feb. 4, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (discussing public
remarks of Vince Ryszewski, a bank examiner for the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation).
239 Telephone interview with Robert Keim, Assistant Comnir of the Dep't of
Banking and Fin. Insts., State of North Dakota (Nov. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as Keim interview]; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-02-02 (1975).
24 0 Keim interview, supra note 239.
241 L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1981, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
242 Although most state courts have recently attempted to narrow or abolh
municipal tort immunities, these immunities retain some life in many states, often 15
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quickly point out, state and federal grant-in-aid programs generally
prefer public to private applicants for aid.243 A city is exempt from
OSHA regulations, but a homeowners association whose activities
affect interstate commerce is not.244  Perhaps most significantly, the
tax status of a city is vastly superior to the tax status of an associa-
tion. A city's tax advantages alone probably outweigh any legal
disadvantages a city suffers. When the choice is available to them,
residents of an association often "go public" to exploit the tax
advantages of the municipal form.
245
The pro-city tax bias mainly arises from three statutory
policies: (1) the exemption from federal income taxation of intercst
paid to municipal bondholders; (2) the deductibility of municipal
taxes (but not homeowners-association assessments) from the income
that is subject to federal tax; and (3) the exemption of most mu-
nicipally owned land from the property taxes imposed by other
governments. Each of these warrants brief discussion.
Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code exempts interest
paid on municipal bonds from federal income taxation.246 This
exemption usually enables cities to borrow money at annual interest
rates several percentage points below the rates that corporate bor-
rowers pay. Because taxpayers nationwide bear the revenue losses
resulting from this exemption, city officials often attempt to arrange
for municipal-bond financing of a wide variety of local capital im-
provements that they might otherwise leave to the private sector.
This tax provision is a principal reason that cities now build hous-
ing,247 make home loans,248 run convention centers and stadiums, 24 9
grace of a partial legislative reprieve. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-965.9
(West 1980). See generally K. DAVIs, ADmIIsTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 25.00
(1970, 1976 & 1980 Supps.). Municipalities are still typically immune from
liability for punitive damages. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 903 (1951).
Municipalities are free from antitrust liability vhen they pursue express state
policies. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982).
243 See, e.g., Aid to Nonpublic Education, 1971-72: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 138 (1971-72) (statement of Gary Potter, et al.).
244 See 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976).
245 See infra text accompanying notes 254-55.
246 See I.R.C. § 103(a) (1976). There are two major exceptions to this gen-
eral rule. First, I.R.C. § 103(b) denies the exemption of interest on certain industrial
development bonds issued after April 30, 1968. Second, I.R.C. § 103(c) denies the
exemption of interest on arbitrage bonds.
247 See supra note 215.
248 See supra note 226.
249 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 218; State v. City of Tampa, 146 So. 2d
100 (Fla. 1962) (affirming city's power to build convention center financed with
special obligation bonds).
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operate parking structures,250 and finance the construction of in-
dustrial plants 21 and antipollution equipment. 25 In effect, section
103 constitutes a multibillion-dollar-per-year inducement for city
enterprise.2
3
Internal Revenue Code section 164 entitles nonbusiness tax-
payers to deduct, as an itemized deduction, amounts paid for most
types of municipal taxes.254 The compulsory assessments levied by
homeowners associations, by contrast, are generally not deductible.255
Everything else being equal, this disparity in tax treatment leads a
community resident to prefer that recreation programs, public
security operations, and other community services be financed by
cities, not private associations. The quest for deductibility helps
explain why wealthy residents in such private residential associa-
tions as Hidden Hills, Palos Verdes Estates, and Rolling Hills,
California, eventually decided also to incorporate themselves as
municipalities. "Going public" enabled them to shift to federal
taxpayers part of the costs of financing local services.
250 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 396, 254 A.2d 273 (1969);
Goldberg v. City Council, 273 S.C. 140, 254 S.E.2d 803 (1979) (upholding city
use of eminent domain powers and bonding authority to build parking facilities).
251 Nearly all states permit municipalities to issue industrial revenue bonds
(IRB's) to acquire or build factories for sale or lease to private concerns. See,
e.g., State v. City of Riviera Beach, 397 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1981) (building and
leasing of electronics plant located beyond city boundaries); Carruthers v. Port of
Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 438 P.2d 725 (1968) (building and leasing of aluminum
processing plant). However, after listing authorities in dozens of states that
permit IRB's, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that these bonds fail to
meet the public purpose clause of the North Carolina constitution. Mitchell v.
North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968).
North Carolina voters then approved a constitutional amendment authorizing
counties to issue IRB's. N.C. CONsT. art. 5, § 9 (1976).
252 See, e.g., Fickes v. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 470 P.2d 287 (1970)
(county bonds); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Town of Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 507
P.2d 1074 (1973). But see Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of Longview, 84 Wash.
2d 475, 527 P.2d 263 (1974) (pollution-control bond issue would violate constitu-
tional clause prohibiting municipal loans to private corporations).
253 See 1 B. Brrrma, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INcOME, ESTATS AND GiFTs
15-2 to 15-3 n.2 (1981), which cites a Joint Economic Committee estimate that in
fiscal 1976 state and local borrowers saved $3.5 billion in interest expense because
of the exemption.
254 See I.R.C. § 164 (1976).
255 Rev. Rul. 76-495, 1976-2 C.B. 43, states the general rule that "assessments
paid to a homeowner's association by its members for the exclusive purpose of
promoting the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of the residents and for main-
taining common areas of a residential housing project are not deductible as real
property taxes." Note the similarity between the described functions and the
normal functions of a local government. The IRS does allow a pass-through to
the condominium owner of deductions for "taxes assessed on his interest in property."
Rev. Rul. 64-31, 1964-1 C.B. 300. Similar treatment is rendered shareholders in
cooperative housing corporations, who may deduct their share of interest and taxes
paid by the cooperative. See I.R.C. § 216 (1976).
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In several states,- all municipally owned land, regardless of use,
is categorically exempt from property taxation by the state and
other local governments. Thus, if Houston, Texas, were to open a
city bank, the bank's offices would be exempt from Harris County
property taxes.256 . In perhaps a greater number of states, however,
municipal land enjoys a property-tax exemption only when it is
devoted to either a "public use' or a "public purpose." A city's
bank building might possibly fail this test in Illinois and Wyoming,
but would probably meet it in New Jersey and New York.257 Like
the Internal Revenue Code, a good number of state tax codes thus
implicitly subsidize public enterprise.
258
3. Redressing the Legal Inequalities
I hereby conditionally agree to support Frug's call for the re-
moval of any remaining legal restrictions that prevent cities from
engaging in business activities. As one who favors decentralized
256 City of Beaumont v. Fertitta, 415 S.W.2d 902, 911 (Tex. 1967); accord
Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist. v. Lincoln County, 144 Neb. 584, 14
N.W.2d 202 (1944).
257 The Illinois Supreme Court's rather strict interpretation of "public purpose"
is exemplified by City of Lawrenceville v. Maxwell, 6 Ill. 2d 42, 126 N.E.2d 671
(1955). The court placed the burden of proof on the municipality to show that
it was pursuing an exclusively public purpose. In that case, the municipality
leased part of its airport property to private farmers and used the rental income
to defray airport expenses. The court held that this was not a public purpose
and subjected the rented airport property to state property taxes.
Wyoming also rather strictly defines "public purpose" in demarcating property
tax exemptions. In City of Cheyenne v. Board of County Comm'rs, 484 P.2d 706
(Wyo. 1971), the court held that a city airport building leased to a city-and-county
subsidized private ambulance service was not devoted to a public use and was
taxable.
In New Jersey, "the phrase 'used for public purposes' should be liberally con-
strued; it probably includes any municipal enterprise which the legislature has
authorized." Hanover Township v. Town of Morristown, 4 N.J. Super. 22, 24, 66
A.2d 187, 188 (App. Div. 1949). The Hanover court upheld a property tax
exemption for a municipal airport located in another municipality.
The New York approach is examined in Note, Municipal Property Tax Ex-
emption: Application of New York's 'Held for Public Use' Standard, 45 ALB. L.
REv. 740 (1981), which states that New York courts have primarily used a standard
of "public access" in deciding "public use." For example, hangars at a municipal
airport are not exempt from taxation. Town of Harrison v. County of Westchester,
13 N.Y.2d 258, 196 N.E.2d 240, 246 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1963). But locally owned
stadiums are exempt. Dubbs v. Board of Assessment Review, 81 Misc. 2d 591, 367
N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
258 Cities enjoy other tax advantages as well. I.R.C. § 115(1) (1976) exempts
from taxation city income derived from the performance of "any essential govern-
mental function." This provision would possibly shelter the profits of a city bank
from federal income taxation. If it did not, the organizers of the city bank might
try to qualify the bank as an exempt nonprofit organization under I.R.C. § 501(c).
Owners of private banks could try neither of these moves. Homeowners associa-
tions, it should be noted, are now often able to avoid paying federal taxes on
income. See id. § 528 (added in 1976).
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public decisionmaking, I am willing to entitle a city to socialize
formerly private sectors of its economy. However, because I adhere
to the prevailing economic view that public-sector activity is justi-
fied only in cases of market failure, -I would of course oppose any
campaigns in my city to establish a city -bank, insurance company,
or food-retailing cooperative.259 -Nevertheless, if some cities -choose
to experiment with public enterprise, perhaps we will all learn
something more about the robustness of current economic theory.
My condition for agreeing with Frug is that he agree that
municipal businesses be placed on the same legal footing as private
businesses. This means, for example, that city businesses could not
enjoy special tort and antitrust immunities, or any preferred access
to financial support from higher-level governments. More impor-
tantly, it would mean that city businesses would lose their significant
tax preferences. In some states, one of Frug's proposed city banks
might now conceivably be able to .
" raise its equity capital through property taxes, thereby
entitling equity contributors to federal income tax
deductions;
* borrow debt capital at below-market interest rates be-
cause of the tax-exempt status of municipal-bond
interest;
" own real estate that would be exempt from property
taxation; and
* avoid federal taxation of its "corporate" income.
As long as cities have advantages like these, any legal rules limiting
their power to engage in business can be justified on grounds simi-
lar to the grounds that underlie the economic theory of second best.
In other words, the "wrong" rules on city powers are in fact appro-
priate because those rules offset other legal advantages that cities
wrongly possess. My own guess is that if the legal treatment of
cities and private organizations were substantially equalized, politi-
cal forces would on balance lead to some shrinkage in the size of
the local public sector.
Because I stand conditionally ready to join Frug in supporting
the expansion of city business powers, I hope. he will join me in
2 5 9 As it happens, the city council of Palo Alto, Cal. (the city where I live),
recently considered marketing homeowners' insurance. The council eventually
dropped the idea, in part because of opposition from private insurance agents.
Peninsula Times-Tribune, Mar. 9, 1982, § A, at 1, col. 1. Newspaper reports of
the debate over this proposal do not indicate that the opponents questioned the
city's power to sell insurance.
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endorsing two specific tax reforms. First, because there is no per-
suasive reason for the federal government generally to subsidize
borrowing by subfederal governments, Congress should amend the
Internal Revenue Code to subject to federal income taxation all
interest paid on future state 260 and local bond issues. The current
exemption of interest paid on municipal bonds encourages cities
to borrow capital that would earn a higher social return if invested
privately.261 Despite what the mayors and the municipal-bond lobby
would have us believe, there are probably no serious constitutional
barriers to this reform.
262
Second, Congress should amend section 164 of the Internal
Revenue Code to limit the extent to which a nonbusiness, itemizing
taxpayer can deduct his payments for state and local taxes from
income. Homeowners-association members are currently not en-
titled to deduct their monthly assessments because it is assumed
that the value of the association services they receive equals the
value of the assessments they pay. This assumption is largely valid
because both market forces and legal rules make it difficult for an
association to redistribute much wealth. To exclude members'
assessment payments from their income would therefore be to
underestimate their affluence.
2 63
However, households that pay taxes to cities and states also
receive valuable public services in return for those payments. Pro-
fessor Bittker and other tax scholars have nevertheless half-heartedly
260 The abolition of the tax-exempt status of state bonds will curb tendencies
toward excessive state enterprise. Moreover, if municipalities lost their exemption
but states did not, states would be tempted to become wholesale borrowers on
behalf of their cities.
261As the real borrowing costs of municipal governments fall lower and
lower relative to the real borrowing costs of private firms, more and more
dollars are diverted from private investments with high social return to
public investments with lower social return. The result is a loss of
economic efficiency: a reduction in the society's total output of goods and
services. Unquestionably, some such loss of economic efficiency results
from the [municipal bond] exemption.
M. MussA & R. KORMENDi, TAxATION OF MuuicrPL BoNms 213-14 (1979).
262 See Martori & Bliss, Taxation of Municipal Bond Interest-"Interesting
Speculation" and One Step Forward, 44 NoTam DAmE LAw. 191 (1968); Surrey,
Federal Income Taxation of State and Local Government Obligations, TAX POL'Y,
May-June 1969, at 3, 13. Contra Goldberg, A Call to Action: State Sovereignty,
Deregulation, and the World of Municipal Bonds, 13 URB. LAw. 253 (1981); Healy,
The Assault on Tax-Exempt Bonds, TAx PoL'Y, July-Aug. 1969, at 2. See generally
Gabinet, The Municipal Bond Interest Exemption: Comments on a Running Battle,
24 CASE W. l.Es. L. REv. 64 (1972); Note, Reform of the Municipal Bond
Market: Alternatives to Tax-Exempt Financing, 15 COLUm. J.L. & Soc. Thons.
233 (1979).
263This approach assumes the administrative impossibility of counting as
income the value of services received.
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defended the deductibility of state and local taxes on the ground
that there is only a loose fit between what the taxpayer pays and
what he receives in public services.2".. This looseness of fit arises
because local and state governments, do redistribute a fair amount
of wealth by, for example, financing.public schools.and universities
that are likely to be of different benefit to. taxpayers who pay the
same amount of tax.
A "loose fit" is not "no fit," however. Virtually all taxpayers
receive some significant benefits from state and local services. Never-
theless the Internal Revenue Code not only fails to count the value
of these services as income, but also authorizes the 100% deduction
of state and local taxes. These tax policies, combined with the
Code's disallowance of the deduction of payments to homeowners
associations (and most other private entities), produce a federal-tax
bias in favor of the public provision of services. Put another way,
the Code exaggerates the affluence of association members relative
to the affluence of city residents,-and subjects the former to higher
taxes.
How might Congress neutralize the Code's influence on com-
munity choice between the public and private provision of services?
As an initial proposal, I suggest that Congress amend section 164
to authorize itemizing taxpayers to deduct from income only one-
third, instead of 100%/, of amounts paid to state 265 and local tax
collectors. Allowing the one-third deduction would serve two pur-
poses. First, it would compensate all taxpayers for the probable
inefficiency of state and local governments, which, pace Galbraith
and Frug, currently appear unable to give out as much as they take
in. 266 Second, the one-third deduction provides a modest cushion
to protect taxpayers who end up on the losing etid of state and local
redistributive programs. I have no great confidence that one-third
is the best fraction to use. But would my amended section 164 be
worse than the current section 164, which implicitly assumes that
state and local taxpayers receive no benefits from state and local
programs? 267
264 See Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, .Credits, and Subsidies for Personal
Expenditures, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 193, 201 (1973); see also U.S. DEP'T Or iian
TnEsuny, BLuEPRiNTS FOn BASIc TAx RFoRom 92 (1977).
265Disallowing any greater deductibility of state taxes avoids creating an
incentive for states to do revenue-raising, on.-behalf of their local governments.
Cf. supra note 260.
266 See supra note 197.
267 Cf. Bittker, supra note 264, at 201 (te deductibility of state and local taxes
is perhaps only justified to the extent of the redistributive component of state -and
local spending). " .
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V; CONCLUSION
Professor Frug and I agree that current legal doctrine distin-
guishes too sharply between cities and private associations. The
imperfectly voluntary: nature of membership in a city is the only
salient difference between the two forms of organization. This
difference does-justify some variations in legal treatment-for ex-
ample, stricter judicial scrutiny of association rulemaking. Many
other legal distinctions between -cities and homeowners associations,
however, should be softened or eliminated so that
* a taking clause Would constrain the actions of asso-
ciations;
* associations would be free to choose among a wide
variety of voting rules;
* cities would be free from the Supreme Court's current
mandate that they allocate votes according to a one-
resident/one-vote rule;
* cities would be free of any remaining federal and state
restrictions on their power to engage in business enter-
prises; and
* cities would be stripped of the tax preferences and
other legal advantages they currently enjoy.
Critical legal scholars admit that they have too rarely focused
their analytic apparatus on specific policy proposals.2 68 I have in-
tentionally served up some middle-level proposals for them to react
to. I hope to receive focused comments on the substance of these
proposals, not just Olympian evaluations of the "coherence" of my
"discourse."
Professor Duncan Kennedy, the spiritual leader of the critical
legal scholars, wrote recently: "[W]e need utopian speculation. We
need to spend time not on scientism but on dreaming up the ways
we think things might be better than they are. Utopian speculation
is in some ways the hardest to come by. What would we do with
power, anyway?" 269
Is it possible that the people of Minot, North Dakota, know
better than the critical legal scholars the inauspicious track record
of utopian speculators? 270
Adoption of my proposed reform would make itemizing taxpayers interested
in expanding the role of charitable organizations. The Code may be due for
tightening in that area as well.
268 Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YAIau L.J. 1017, 1056 (1981).
26 9 Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YA.E L. 1275, 1283
(1981).
270 See supra text accompanying notes 234-41.
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